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ARTICLES
DEHUMANIZATION "BECAUSE OF SEX": THE MULTIAXIAL
APPROACH TO THE RIGHTS OF SEXUAL MINORITIES
by
Shirly Lin-
Although Title VII prohibits discrimination against any employee "because of such
individual's ... sex," legal commentators have notyet accuratey appraised Title VII's
trait and causation requirements embodied in that phrase. Since 2015, most courts
assessing the sex discrimination claims of LGBT employees began to intentionally an-
alyze "sex" as a trait using social-construction evidence, and evaluated separately
whether the discriminatory motive caused the workplace harm. Responding to what this
Article terms a "doctrinal correction" to causation within this groundswell of decisions,
the Supreme Court recenty issued an "expansive" and "sweeping" reformulation of
but-for causation in Bostock v. Clayton County, one that combined the sex-trait
anaysis with causation anaysis in determining that Title VII protects "traits or ac-
tions" related to sexual orientation or gender identity.
Because Bostock did notforeclose the use of social evidence or intersectional approaches
in additional subordination contexts in which sex is afactor, this Article builds on this
important development by introducing "multiaxial analysis, " aframework with which
judges and stakeholders identi' the role of Title VII's protected traits as socially
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constructed along four axes: the arieved individual's sef-identification, the defendant-
employer, societ, and the state. This context-sensitive approach to subordination has
the potential to give fuller effect to Title VII's provisions and puposes as compared to
sex-stereotyping theory or the Court's reformulated "butfor causation." Uncoupling
causation from the sex trait analysis realizes the statute's civil rights protections within
relational, structural, and institutional dynamics as the law increasingy recognizes that
the scope of sex extends beyond afixed binay.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1983, Judge John F. Grady presided over a trial of the discrimination claims
of Karen F. Ulane, a commercial airline pilot and a decorated Vietnam veteran with
an excellent flying record.' Ms. Ulane revealed her transgender identity to her em-
ployer, Eastern Airlines, after undergoing sex reassignment surgery in 1980.2 The
airline then fired her, claiming that she was mentally ill and unfit to fly, despite
1 Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. Ill. 1983) [hereinafter "Ulane 1"].
2 Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1083 (7th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter "Ulane IT"].
DEHUMANIZATION "BECAUSE OF SEX"
certification from the FAA to the contrary.3 In a post-trial opinion, the court con-
cluded without hesitation that Ms. Ulane's firing was "related to" or "because of'
her sex.4
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. ("Ulane 1") advanced a pluralistic approach to sex
that was profound for its time. A fair reading of sex necessarily raised "a question
of one's own self- perception [and] also a social matter: How does society perceive
the individual?"5 Analogizing to recognition of a new "Hispanic" race well after
Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Judge Grady held that
discrimination includes evidence of "stereotypes, misperceptions, and other moti-
vations" against Hispanics, even though public opinion regarding their "non-white"
status remained divided.6 The court emphasized its responsibility to interpret the
plain language of the statute neutrally in applying the law in spite of, and specifically
because of, hostility to sexual minorities7 and society's extant beliefs about "sex,"
including his own:
Prior to my participation in this case, I would have had no doubt that the question
of sex was a very straightforward matter of whether you are male or female. . . . I
had never been exposed to the arguments or to the problem. After listening to
the evidence in this case, it is clear to me that there is no settled definition in the
medical community as to what we mean by sex.8
When the airline took adverse actions against Ms. Ulane because of her "trans-
sexual" status, it engaged in discrimination, the court concluded as to causation.
Ulane I attracted years of press coverage, and pressure upon courts to uphold the
notion of sex as a rigid binary began to mount.9 Merely five months after Judge
Grady's decision, the Seventh Circuit reversed. Rejecting a socially constructed view
3 Ulane I, 581 F. Supp. at 834-35.
4 Id. at 822.
s Id. at 823 (referring to sexual identity as a component of sex).
6 Id. at 823-24 (citing Carrillo v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 538 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ill. 1982)); see
Gloria Sandrino-Glasser, Los Confundidos: De-Conflating Latinos/ as' Race and Ethnicity, 19 CHICANO-
LATINO L. REV. 69, 128-29 (1998) (discussing introduction of category "Spanish heritage
population" in 1970 U.S. census and, after political pressure, 1980 census requirement that all
respondents indicate if they were of "Spanish/Hispanic" origin or descent).
7 For the purposes of this Article, "sexual minorities" refer to the broad array of self
identified sexes, genders, and sexual orientations including, but not limited to, lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, non-binary, gender fluid, agender and asexual individuals.
The term's meaning here is distinct from its alternative usage referring to marginalized sexualities
and is not intended to imply homogeneity among all communities or permanent minority status.
As this Article demonstrates, sex-linked traits are not mutually exclusive and may overlap.
8 Ulane I, 581 F. Supp. at 823.
9 Id. at 836. "Transgender," as used in this Article, refers to people whose gender identity
(one's internal, deeply-held sense of being male, female, or a non-binary gender) and sex expressly
differ from what is typically associated with the sex or gender assigned to them at birth. It should
be noted that a subset of the transgender community may identify themselves by the older term
"transsexual," to distinguish them from others covered by the umbrella term "transgender."
However, many disfavor the term transsexual as "overly medical, scientific, and technical, or
because the word's integration of the term sex could be taken to sexualize the person." Lisa A.
Mottet, Modernii-ng State Vital Statistics Statutes and Policies to Ensure Accurate Gender Markers on Birth
Certificates, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 373, 387 n.45 (2013) (emphasis in original).
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of sex, the appellate court insisted that the "ordinary, common meaning" of sex
limited Title VII harms to "discriminat[ion] against women because they are women
and against men because they are men," and dismissively referred to Ms. Ulane as
one "discontent with the sex into which they [sic] were born." 0
But nearly four decades later, it is Ulane I that best models a pluralistic analysis
of sex as a trait-what counts as "sex" is socially constructed." Between 2015 and
the Court's recent pathbreaking decision in Bostock v. Clayton Couny,12 many courts
implicitly revived the approach of Ulane I to at least agree that (1) "sex," as a pro-
tected trait, must be analyzed in its social context; and (2) the statute's causation
provision reaches any serious subordinating conduct based upon a protected trait,
not simply group favoritism in prefering men over women, or vice versa. In partic-
ular, most federal courts adjudicating these cases brought by LGBT plaintiffs ap-
plied pluralistic approaches to defining sex as a social trait, ruling in their favor. The
trend spans two circuit court decisions concluding that employees discriminated
against based upon their transgender status may bring Title VII sex discrimination
claims;'3 two circuit courts en banc holding the same with respect to employees dis-
criminated against based upon their sexual orientation;4 two circuit court decisions
finding transgender students are covered under Title IX's analogous provisions;"
10 Ulane II, 742 F.2d at 1085 (using the term "transsexual").
11 Eastern Airlines ultimately settled the case. See Inside: the Judiciary, Burger Takes Hill's Advice,
WASH. PoST, Apr. 22, 1985 at A13 (reporting Court denied certiorari to hear appeal from reversal
of trial court opinion); Associated Press, Obituary, Karen Ulane, 48, Pilot Who Had Sex Change, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 1989, at 25 (noting Ms. Ulane received "substantially more" in settlement from
defendant after appellate court reversal of trial court decision in her favor).
12 Days before this Article was finalized for publication, the Supreme Court issued Bostock,
which held that "[a]n employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires
that person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex." Bos-
tock v. Clayton Cty., No. 17-1618, slip op. at 2 (590 U.S. _ (2020)) (emphasis added). The opinion
indeed embraced the "but-for causation" argument that emerged after the Second Circuit's deci-
sion in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 121 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc), but also re-
envisioned Title VII's causation standard as "sweeping" and "expansive" for the doctrinal reasons
explored in depth in this Article. Bostock, slip op. at 5, 6, 17.
13 EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d 560, 600 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding
that adverse employment action based upon a plaintiffs transgender status and transitioning
status in se, as well as based upon sex stereotypes, are viable grounds for sex discrimination under
Title VII) [hereinafter "Haris FuneralHomes"]; Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC, 641 Fed.
App'x 883, 884 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). The author served as pro bono counsel to plaintiff
Esther Chavez in a limited capacity on appeal.
14 Zarda, 883 F.3d at 121 (holding that discrimination based upon sexual orientation is
prohibited discrimination motivated by sex); Hively v. Ivy Tech Comm. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d
339, 346-47 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (same).
15 Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d 1034, 1049-50 (7th Cir. 2017), cert.
dismissed, 138 S. Ct. 1260 (2018) (mem.); Dodds v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 845 F.3d 217, 221 (6th
Cir. 2016). District court Title IX decisions include Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 400 F.
Supp. 3d 444, 451 (E.D. Va. 2019); Adams ex rel. Kasper v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cty., 318 F.
Supp. 3d 1293, 1325 (M.D. Fla. 2018); M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ. of Talbot Cty., 286 F. Supp. 3d
704, 715 (D. Md. 2018); A.H. ex rel. Handling v. Minersville Area Sch. Dist., 290 F. Supp. 3d 321,
329 (M.D. Pa. 2017); Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 297 (W.D. Pa.
2017); Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 870-
71 (S.D. Ohio 2016).
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and the vast majority of district courts adjudicating these issues nationwide.16 Four
circuits overruled decades of precedent that had concluded sex discrimination does
not reach anti-trans and anti-gay hostility under a narrow definition of sex, and a
fifth signaled it would do the same.1 7
Legal commentary, however, has largely ignored the approaches to trait and
causation these courts advanced. In short, the recent decisions share four important
characteristics. First, the "anti-classification" approach'8 is not the only way to de-
fine disparate treatment under Title VII.1 9 Second, the decisions advance viewpoint
16 E.g., EEOC v. A & E Tire, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1129, 1136 (D. Colo. 2018); Verdict
Form at 2, Tudor v. S.E. Okla. State Univ., No. 15-0324 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 20, 2017) (awarding a
transgender plaintiff $1.165 million in damages on her claims of sex discrimination and retaliation
pursuant to Title VII); Valentine Ge v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., No. 6:15-CV-1029-ORL-41GJK,
2017 WL 347582, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 2017); Roberts v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 215 F. Supp.
3d 1001, 1015 (D. Nev. 2016); Mickens v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 3:16CV-00603 JHM, 2016 WL
7015665, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 29, 2016); Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509,
526 (D. Conn. 2016). But see Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co., 915 F.3d 328, 333 (5th Cir. 2019) (Ho, J.,
concurring) (opining that Title VII sex discrimination does not cover discrimination against
transgender individuals); Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 723 Fed. App'x 964, 964 (11th
Cir. 2018) (holding Title VII sex discrimination does not prohibit anti-homosexual animus); Evans
v. Ga. Regional Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 2017) (same).
17 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 526, 533 (3d Cir. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 2636 (2019) (rejecting claims based upon Title IX and constitutional privacy
brought by cisgender plaintiffs challenging policy allowing transgender students to use bathrooms
and locker rooms aligned with their gender identity and sex, and noting a ruling for plaintiffs
would violate transgender students' Title IX rights). Katie Eyer presciently observed that
increasingly "meaningful engagement" of federal courts' textual approach with LGBTQIA+
advocacy has blazed the path in reversing the "traditional judicial response." Katie R. Eyer,
Statutory Orginalism and LGBT Rights, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 63, 83 (2019). I note that
additionally, the EEOC's decision to interpret sex discrimination to reach bias against LGBT
employees through agency decisions and strategic enforcement litigation since 2012, including
Harris Funeral Homes, played a broader role in bringing about the post 2015 wave than the
otherwise significant public values embodied in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). See
Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5-7 July 15, 2015)
(recognizing anti-gay animus as sex discrimination under comparator, associational, and sex-
stereotyping theories); Lusardi v. McHugh, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133395, 2015 WL 1607756,
at *9, *12 (Apr. 1, 2015) (prohibiting severe, intentional misgendering of a transgender employee
as hostile work environment and the banning use of restrooms aligned with affirmed sex as denial
of a basic term and condition of employment); Jameson v. Donahoe, EEOC Appeal No.
0120130992, 2013 WL 2368729, at *2 (May 21, 2013) (recognizing anti-transgender animus as sex
discrimination); Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *11 (Apr.
20, 2012) (same); STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT PLAN FY 2013-2016, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMISSION 10 (2012).
18 The "anti-classification" approach is shorthand for formal equality principles of
interpretation that generally only prohibit "classify[ing] people either overtly or surreptitiously on
the basis of a forbidden category," elevating group-based rights over individual rights more
commonly associated with anti-subordination approaches. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The
American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 9, 10
(2003); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits ofAntidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF.
L. REv. 1, 41 (2006).
19 E.g., Harrs Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d at 578 (holding "a trait need not be exclusive to one
sex to nevertheless be a function of sex."); Zarda, 883 F.3d at 123 n.23 ("Taking individuals as the
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neutrality: the courts respect the dignitary interest in defining one's own identity,
taking care not to impose status labels from the harassers or the courts themselves
on the plaintiffs.20 Third, for plaintiffs who do not identify with a fixed binary no-
tion of sex, the decisions-and now the Supreme Court in Bostock-implicitly rec-
ognize "misperception" claims and reject "actuality defenses" that had required
some plaintiffs to prove membership in a "protected class."2' Finally, but not uni-
formly, these courts identify the link between sexual minorities' contested status and
the protected trait through social-construction evidence. Until Bostock, a plurality
within the Second Circuit's Zarda decision arguing "but-for causation" analysis was
an outlier in conflating trait with causation, signaling a fundamental reinterpretation
of Title VII causation doctrine.22
This Article builds on this judicial trend by introducing multiaxial analysis, i.e.,
a contextual model for Title VII discrimination across dimensions of identity that
Ulane I successfully applied to one trait, sex. Multiaxial analysis identifies the role of
a protected trait along the following axes-the individual self, the defendant em-
ployer, society, and the state23-that courts analyze interactively, so if there is evi-
dence that a plaintiff's status or conduct is disputed by the defendant employer, one
can establish a link to the protected trait. Under this approach, a court can consider
unit of analysis, the question is not whether discrimination is borne only by men or only by
women[.]").
20 See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
21 See Bostock v. Clayton Cty., No. 17-1618, slip op. at 10 (590 U.S. __ (2020)) (prohibiting
employers from "penaliz[ing]" or "fir[ing] a transgender person who was identified male at birth
but who now identifies as a female"); infra note 147 and accompanying text. Several scholars have
termed this phenomenon as misperception claims or regarded-as claims where actual "protected
class" membership became a judicially created requirement in race, color, national origin, and
religion contexts. E.g., D. Wendy Greene, Categoricaly Black, White, or Wrong: "Misperception
Discrmination" and the State of Title VII Protection, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 87, 89-90 (2013); see also
Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being "Regarded As" Black,
and Why Title VII Should Appy Even if Lakisha and Jamal are White, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 1283, 1325,
1333-34, 1343 (2005).
22 Under this analysis, the plurality argued that swapping a gay man for a heterosexual
woman as the employee attracted to men as determinative to the employer's decision-a "but-for
causation" that met "because of sex." Zarda, 883 F.3d at 116-19 (plurality). See infra Part II.B.3.
At the time this Article was published, the Supreme Court's decisions in the trio of Title VII cases
addressing transgender identity and sexual orientation-RG. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc.
v. EEOC, 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 18-107); Altitude
Express, Inc. v. Zarda, and Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 894 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. granted,
139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 17-1618)-had not been decided. The author was a signatory to the
Brief of Law & History Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Aimee Stephens,
RG. & G.R Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 18-107); and to the
Brief of Employment Discrimination Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of the Employees,
RG. & G.R Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 18-107); Altitude
Express, Inc. v. Zarda, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 17-1623); Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 139 S. Ct.
15 (2019) (No. 17-1618).
23 In Bostock, the Court isolated one sex trait as a binary male/female metaphor and did not
foreclose defining "sex" with social-construction evidence, stating that "nothing in our approach
to these [consolidated] cases turns on the outcome." Bostock, slip op. at 5. The Bostock Court also
began its analysis by noting that the "only statutorily protected characteristic at issue in today's
case is 'sex."' Id.; see also infra Part III.B.1 (applying multiaxial analysis to Gerald Bostock's case).
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the protected trait(s) in a multidimensional way compared to traditional methods,
such as the single-dimension comparator method. Importantly, it also centers the
plaintiffs self- identification so that courts do not adopt the harasser's viewpoint
that contradicts a sincerely held sex-based identification.24 Unlike recent proposals
to anchor Title VII's context analysis to existing approaches such as sex-plus doc-
trine2 or stereotyping theory,26 multiaxial analysis marks a return to the statute's
open-ended terms.
By presenting multiaxial analysis, this Article makes a unique contribution to
the voluminous legal literature on "sex" discrimination. Sex discrimination scholar-
ship overwhelmingly addresses sex within the male-female dyad.27 Some scholars
have provided crucial analysis of the importance of sex to a specific status, such as
sexual orientation and transgender and intersex status.28 Fewer scholars have at-
tempted to theorize the full potential scope of the sex trait. Zachary Kramer pro-
posed a model of sex discrimination analogous to Title VII's treatment of religion
as a "status and practice," such that sex includes gender and sexual orientation.29
Kimberly Yuracko proposed a "power-access" approach that would prohibit em-
ployer conduct that reinforces sex norms.30 Katherine Franke persuasively argued
that sex, when used to oppress, is not only the ac/us reus of subordination, but may
24 See supra note 20. As discussed infra Part III, the multiaxial analysis proposed in this Article
shares the goals e. christi cunningham offered in her reconceptualization project for
discrimination: deconstructing the identity politics driving the doctrine and dignifying self
identification as indispensable in adjudication.
25 See, e.g., Kate Sablonsky Elengold, Clustered Bias, 96 N.C. L. REv. 457, 498 (2018).
26 See, e.g., Stephanie Bornstein, Un fying Antidiscrimination Law Through Stereotpe Theory, 20
LEwIs & CLARK L. REv. 919, 925 (2016); Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Conplex Female Subject,
92 MICH. L. REv. 2479, 2535 n.208, 2536 (1994).
27 See, e.g., Catharine MacKinnon, Introduction to Symposium on Toward a Feminist Theory of the
State, 35 LAW & INEQ. 255, 258 (2017) ("The sexualized animus that animates male dominance
from the intimate to the institutional to the structural, analyzed as central to sex inequality ...
might also be termed misogyny."); Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENy. U.L.
REv. 995, 1000 (2015) (providing the dominant account of male/female sex discrimination and
mentioning sexuality within the context of gender and stereotyping under existing doctrine).
28 See, e.g., JULIE A. GREENBERG, INTERSEXUALITY AND THE LAW (2012); Jillian Todd Weiss,
Transgender Identiy, Textualism, and the Supreme Court: What Is the "Plain Meaning" of "Sex" in Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of /964?, 18 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 573, 581-89 (2009); Paisley
Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The Struggle to Achieve Judicial and Legislative
Equali for Transgender People, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37, 38 (2000); Sylvia A. Law,
Homosexualiy and the SocialMeaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 187, 188-94 (1988); Dylan Vade,
Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and Legal Conceptualisation of Gender that is
More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & LAw 253, 297-310 (2005). "Intersex," as
used in this Article, refers to the millions of Americans whose anatomy, chromosomal pattern, or
other commonly designated sex characteristics do not fit clearly into the prevailing male-female
binary. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., THEORIES OF SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 416-
17 (2018); Melanie Blackless et al., How Sexualy Dimorphic Are We? Review and Sjnthesis, 12 AM. J.
HUM. Bio. 151, 159 (2000).
29 Zachary A. Kramer, The New Sex Discrimination, 63 DUKE L.J. 891, 940-41 (2014).
3 Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discimination as Sex Discimination: An Argument Against
Neutrali), 83 TEX. L. REv. 167, 225-33 (2004) (framing access with respect to protected groups,
but focusing on women and dyadic sex).
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also effect subordination based upon gender, race, or both, for example.31 Finally,
e. christi cunningham proposed deconstructing the identity politics driving the doc-
trine and dignifying self- identification as indispensable to adjudication.2 Her
"wholism" model differs, however, in its proposal to eliminate intersectionality as a
referent and the use of groups as a frame completely.33 In short, sexually-coded
harm is a social process that can signify and produce multiple dimensions of ine-
quality. As proposed here, multiaxial analysis is the first model to operationalize
multidimensional, contextual dynamics of sex-related subordination that eluded
courts under traditional formalist approaches.34
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I explores the ideological interpreta-
tions of "sex" and shows that sex in 1964, and through today, has been understood
to be complex and capable of new social meanings. Part II situates "because of" sex
within the statute's own terms, analyzing differences in its core provisions and Con-
gress's successive reproaches to the Court for unduly restricted readings of causa-
tion. It then discusses how evidentiary and causation doctrines had been misapplied
to the claims of sexual minorities. Part III introduces multiaxial analysis as a way for
determining a characteristic's link to a protected trait, conceptualizing axes of sub-
ordination that can account for relational, structural, or institutional dynamics. The
multiaxial approach reaches additional forms of discrimination and prevents further
impairment to Title VII. Part III also raises and addresses counterarguments to mul-
tiaxial analysis with respect to judicial role and operability.
I. "SEX" AND TITLE VII HERMENEUTICS
This Part addresses the mutually defining nature of sex-linked traits such as
anatomy, sexual orientation, gender presentation, and gender identity, particularly
as reflected in mainstream medicine and social science since the 1950s that the
Court's 2020 Bostock decision declined to explore.3 5 Nonetheless, some courts
31 Katherine M. Franke, Putting Sex to Work, 75 DENy. U.L. REv. 1139, 1142-43 (1998).
32 e. christi cunningham, The Rise of Identiy Politics I: The Myth of the Protected Class in Title VII
Disparate Treatment Cases, 30 CONN. L. REv. 441, 500 (1998) [hereinafter cunningham, The Rise of
Identity Politics 1]; e. christi cunningham, The "Racing" Cause of Action and the Identity Formery Known
as Race: The Road to Tamazunchale, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 707, 712 (1999).
33 cunningham, The Rise ofIdentip Politics I, supra note 32, at 499-500.
34 Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Intersectionali) at 30: Mapping the Margins of Anti-
Essentialism, Intersectionali), and Dominance Theory, 132 HARv. L. REv. 2193, 2202 (2019) (discussing
critiques by Angela Harris and Kimberl6 Crenshaw regarding the norming of anti-discrimination
law along the experiences of white women for sex, and Black men for race, in "how difference
had been doctrinally categorized"). As Darren Hutchinson has observed, one cannot "adequately
examine or provide solutions to one form of subordination without analyzing how it is affected
and shaped by other systems of domination." Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identi' Crisis:
Intersectionali, Multidimensionali), and the Development of an Adequate Theoy of Subordination, 6 MICH.
J. RACE & L. 285, 308 (2001); see also infra Part IIIC.
3s Bostock v. Clayton Cty., No. 17-1618, slip op. at 5 (590 U.S. __ (2020)) (noting that
employees argued that, "even in 1964, the term sex bore a broader scope, capturing more than
anatomy and reaching at least some norms concerning gender identity and sexual orientation,"
but "concede[d]" that "'sex' in 1964 referred to 'status as either male or female [as] determined
by reproductive biology' . . . for argument's sake"). This Article emphasizes the medical and legal
dimensions of sex in non-exhaustive terms to demonstrate the inconsistencies of some textualist
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believe that legal meaning "cannot exist outside of formal governmental institu-
tions" or other dejure forums such as congressional debate.36 They insist on it even
though such institutions have been undemocratic, hostile to, and unrepresentative
of minorities. When courts do so to narrow statutory interpretation, they improperly
stake their own theory of democracy to legitimize the policy outcomes of their de-
cisions.3 7 Part I.A dispels the mythology conservative courts have relied upon to
limit Title VII "sex" to an essentialist, binary meaning. Part I.B addresses the impli-
cations of elevating the classification approach to causation and argues that current
sex-stereotyping theory often rests on an unnecessarily restrictive classification anal-
ysis.
A. Neutral Acknowledgement of the Meanings of "Sex"
The history of Title VII reflects a core belief that it is unjust to deprive anyone
of a livelihood based upon traits known for centuries as bases for dehumanization:
race, color, sex, national origin, and religion.3 8 The meanings of sex and sex discrim-
ination have always turned on Title VII's anti-subordination mandate, which grad-
ually expanded to outlaw disfavoring pregnancy; sexual assault and other compo-
nents of a hostile work environment; demanding sexual conduct as a condition of
employment; using derogatory terms referencing the employee's sex; and sex stere-
otyping.3 9 Neither status nor conduct could be excluded from coverage with respect
to sex and sexual orientation.40
Legal debate over the meaning of sex in the cases brought by sexual minorities
narrowly treats it as either a static concept (i.e., so-called "original public
and all originalist methods that mythologize sex as binary. See infra Part LA, Table 1 and
accompanying discussion.
36 See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocragy: The Changing Structure of Legitimagy in Statutory
Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REv. 593, 595-96 (1995).
37 Jane Shachter has called this approach to statutory interpretation "metademocratic." Id.
38 In a similar vein, the Fifth Circuit once opined: "Congress chose neither to enumerate
specific discriminatory practices, nor to elucidate in extenso the parameter of such nefarious
activities. Rather, it pursued the path of wisdom by being unconstrictive, knowing that constant
change is the order of our day and that the seemingly reasonable practices of the present can easily
become the injustices of the morrow." Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971).
39 See supra note 31, infra notes 49, 102, 111, 129-31.
40 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-51 (1989) (plurality opinion); id. at 260
(White, J., concurring); id. at 272-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of
the Univ. of Calif., Hastings Coll. of Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 689 (2010).
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meaning")41 or a concept that may be "updated" to reflect contemporary social
norms.4 2 Such framing telegraphs the assumption that only contemporary under-
standings acknowledge that sex is variable and complex and that sexual minorities
have a dignitary interest in living consistent with their identity.43 The literature in-
cludes some commentaries (but perhaps not frequently enough) that sex has always
been known to be a product of multiple characteristics, and that the government
(including courts) should not have a role in declaring a party's sex.44 This Part syn-
thesizes history and social science literature in connection with statutory interpreta-
tion of the sex trait for sexual minorities more broadly.
Both textualist and plain-meaning approaches to interpretation prompt courts
to refer to dictionary definitions to settle the question. The definitions reveal that
sex was understood as a pluralistic trait. In Fabian v. Hospital of Central Connecticut,
Judge Underhill demonstrated how, even under a textualist view of "sex," defini-
tions necessarily refer to the non-exclusive process of ascription based upon multi-
ple characteristics: "the sum of the morphological, physiological and behavioral pe-
culiarities of living beings that subserves biparental reproduction ... and that is
41 E.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Comm. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 362 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(Sykes, J., dissenting); Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 143 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc)
(Lynch, J., dissenting); Eyer, supra note 17 at 86-93 (discussing the ascendancy and defects in
original public meaning arguments within Title VII and LGBT anti-discrimination litigation). For
another approach regarding dynamic statutory interpretation, see William N. Eskridge Jr., Title
VII's Statutory History and the Sex Discimination Argument for LGBT Workplace Protections, 127 YALE
L.J. 322, 342 (2017) [hereinafter Eskridge, Title TII's Statutory History] ("A statute-like Title VII-
that has been authoritatively interpreted, amended by Congress on several occasions, and then
reinterpreted is a statute where original meaning itself is a dynamic process and involves
updating."). At this Article's printing, the Bostock Court indeed declared that it would interpret
Title VII according to "ordinary public meaning of its terms at the time of its enactment," but
also extensively relied on "plain terms" and "plain meaning." Bostock v. Clayton Cty., No. 17-
1618, slip op. at 4, 12, 21, 24, 26, 28 (590 U.S. __ (2020)).
42 Compare Hively, 853 F.3d at 353 (Posner, J., concurring) (arguing that like the Sherman Act,
Title VII requires "judicial interpretive updating" to reflect current norms), with id. at 360 (Sykes,
J., dissenting) ("We are not authorized to infuse the text with a new or unconventional meaning
or to update it to respond to changed social, economic, or political conditions.").
43 See, e.g., M. Dru Levasseur, Gender Identity Defines Sex: Updating the Law to Reflect Modern
Medical Science Is Key to Transgender Rights, 39 VT. L. REV. 943, 947 (2015) (arguing transgender
individuals should not be relegated to "boundary-crossers" under the law, but recognized as "part
of a natural variation of human sexual development.").
44 Legal commentary regarding pluralistic sexual complexity has emerged relatively recently
in constitutional discourse. E.g., Chineyere Ezie, Deconstruting the Body: Transgender and Intersex
Identities and Sex Discimination-The Need for Strict Scrutiny, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 141, 154
(2011); William N. Eskridge, Sexual and Gender Variation in American Public Law: From Malignant o
Benign to Productive, 57 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1333 (2010) [hereinafter Eskridge, Sexual and Gender
Variation in American Public Law]; David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CALIF. L. REV.
997 (2002) (discussing disestablishment of sex from state determination); see also, e.g., infra note
237. Broader critiques raising the full breadth of sex complexity in the law include Darren
Rosenblum, Queer Legal Victories: Intersectionali) Revisited, in QUEER MOBILIZATIONS: LGBT
ACTIVISTS CONFRONT THE LAW 38 (Scott Barclay et. al. eds., 2009); Francisco Valdes, Queers,
Sissie, Dyke, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of Sex, Gender and Sexual Orientation in Euro-
American Law and Socie, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1995); Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy:
Tracking the Conflation of Sex, Gender & Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161,
170 (1996).
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typically manifested as maleness or femaleness."45 Fabian's textualist and plain-meaning
arguments for sex pluralism justified a ruling that animus against one's transgender
status in se is Title VII sex discrimination, and became an opening salvo in the post-
2015 doctrinal correction.46
Unpersuaded, a recent dissent in Hivey v. Ivy Tech Commuiwtmy College of Indiana
argued that sexual orientation could not be motivated by sex based considerations
if a court were to consult a "reasonable person" in 1964.47 Arguing an "original
public meaning" approach, Judge Sykes is selectively underinclusive: she insists on
social majoritarian views as the reasonable "man-on-the-street" standard. Erasing
diversity in actual experience and opinion, this alternative would elevate the har-
asser's subjectivity (e.g., "I didn't at any point consider my lesbian target's sex as a
woman who dates women").48 Under this approach, decades of settled Court prec-
edent recognizing sexual assault (including same-sex assault), quid pro quo sexual
harassment, and hostile work environment as discriminatory should also fail under
this version of original public understanding.49 Whether in the form of "public
meaning" or "legislative intent" originalism,50 this line of argument fails to draw a
reasonable distinction between subordination involving, on the one hand, Mad Men-
fantasized harassment (heteronormative, cisgendered, white, and corporate) and on
4s Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 526 (D. Conn. 2016) (citing
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2081 (1961)) (emphasis added).
"Textualism" is a theory of statutory interpretation that contends that a statute's text is the primary
source of meaning, and therefore consideration of legislative history becomes irrelevant. William
N. Eskridge Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 623 n.1 1(1990) (observing that "public
choice theory, separation of powers, and ideological conservatism" animate new textualism). In
its current form, "new textualism," authoritative sources of meaning are generally limited to the
structure of the statute, interpretations of similar provisions, and canons of statutory construction.
Id. at 623-24.
46 Fabian, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 526-27 (citing Ulane I, 581 F. Supp. at 822); see, e.g., Zarda v.
Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 121 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (citing Fabian, 172 F. Supp. 3d
at 524 n.8); Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 205-06 (2d Cir. 2017) (same);
Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. dismissed, 138 S. Ct.
1260 (2018) (mem.) (same, in a Title IX case on behalf of transgender student); Hively, 853 F.3d
at 350 (same, in a Title VII case).
47 Hively, 853 F.3d at 359-60 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (arguing Title VII must be read "as a
reasonable person would have understood it when it was adopted").
48 Id. at 362-63.
49 Id. at 350 n.5; see also Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (establishing
causes of action under Title VII for hostile work environment and "sexual harassment," including
sexual coercion).
so The use of "originalism" reflects a rebranding of a longstanding method of judicial
interpretation limited to constitutional interpretation, but layered on top of textualist arguments
as to statutory interpretation. See generaly Eyer, Statutory Orginalism and LGBT Rights, supra note 17.
Originalists contend that courts should "confine themselves to enforcing norms stated or clearly
implicit in the written Constitution[.]" JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 (13th ed. 1980). Under this approach, fundamental rights are limited to
those expressly stated in the text or, as to the U.S. Constitution, clearly intended by the framers.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 12 (3d ed. 2006).
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the other hand, the sexual harassment of "any individual" whose identity is margin-
alized in public imagination.5 '
The history of sex pluralism is reflected in the definition's use of the word
"typically," per Fabian, and the inextricable act of typology itself. Sexual variation
beyond a binary view was amply acknowledged in medical and social science litera-
ture by mid-century.5 2 In reality, by the 1960s U.S. medical experts in developmental
sexology considered several criteria in determining sex including: genetic or chro-
mosomal sex, gonadal sex, internal morphologic sex, external morphologic sex, hor-
monal sex, phenotypic sex, assigned sex/gender of rearing, and gender identity (i.e.,
self identified sex).53
Thus, for millions of individuals and the medical community, sex cannot be
deemed only biologically external, immutable, or dimorphic.5 4 Julie Greenberg, a
renowned expert on sex and the law, has observed that the notion of gender identity
(i.e., self identified sex, one of the medical factors for sex determination) is based
on nurture rather than nature. The idea that sex is mutable became conventional
medical advice by the 1950s.55 Natural sexual variation by then was admittedly more
51 Compare Zarda, 883 F.3d at 146 (Lynch, J., dissenting) (after acknowledging "[p]erhaps it
did not occur to some of those male members of Congress that sexual harassment of women in
the workplace was a form of employment discrimination, or that Title VII was inconsistent with
a 'Mad Men' culture in the office," nonetheless finding "sexual" exploitation as an obstacle to
equal employment), with Jack B. Harrison, "Because of Sex," 51 Loy. L.A. REV. 91, 196-97 (2018)
(positing that subordination based upon sexual orientation is grounded in gendered hierarchy in
the enforcement of traditional sex and family roles) and Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with
Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691, 744 (1997) (reviewing psychological studies and critical
race theory and arguing sex-based harassment "must not be understood in static terms that allow
for fixed meanings regardless of the context in which they occur" and "may mean different things
depending upon the races of the perpetrator and the victim as well as context." (citing Kimberl6
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidisnminatory
Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 158 (1989)).
52 See generally ELIZABETH REIS, BODIES IN DOUBT, 11-53 (2009); JOANNE MEYEROWITZ,
HOW SEX CHANGED: A HISTORY OF TRANSSEXUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3-5 (2002); ALICE
DOMURAT DREGER, HERMAPHRODITES AND THE MEDICAL INVENTION OF SEX 168 (1998);
Weiss, supra note 28, at 581-89.
s3 See JOHN MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY 11 (1st ed. 1968) [hereinafter MONEY 1st
ed.] (discussing the inaccuracy of Dr. Edwin Keb's position that ovaries and testicles are the only
criteria for sex in 1876); see also JOHN MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY xvii (2d ed. 1994)
[hereinafter MONEY 2d ed.] (acknowledging 37 years of research funding from the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services' Public Health Service); GREENBERG, supra note 28,
at 11 (discussing "at least" eight factors contributing to an individual's sex); Schroer v. Billington,
577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306 n.7 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing expert testimony on the eight factors, that
parsed fetal and pubertal hormonal sex, and added hypothalamic sex); In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68,
73 (Md. 2003) (listing seven medically recognized factors composing a person's gender, including
"[p]ersonal sexual identity" (citing Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuali) and
the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 278 (1999))). Additional literature
discusses gender identity as determinative of sex for purposes of self- identification. See, e.g.,
Levasseur, supra note 43, at 947.
s4 See, e.g., Levasseur, supra note 43, at 980-85.
ss GREENBERG, supra note 28, at 16 (citing 1950s medical journals); see also REIS, supra note
52, at 142. Contemporary medical understanding now concludes the opposite, based upon new
referents. Am. Psychol. Ass'n, Answers to Your.Questions About Transgender People, Gender Identity, and
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complex than male or female. A comprehensive survey of medical literature from
1955 to 2000 concluded that "[b]iologists and medical scientists recognize ... that
absolute dimorphism is a Platonic ideal not actually achieved in the natural world."5 6
Under the prevailing estimate, the frequency of intersexuality is approximately 1.7%
of live births, or millions of Americans at any point in the last half- century.57 Other
societies have even longer histories of viewing sex and gender more expansively.
Sex fluidity has also been documented within the United States throughout the
first eight decades of the twentieth century, reflecting earlier understanding that
gender identity is a major determinant of one's sex.58 Prominent stories include
Christine Jorgensen, who returned from successful sex reassignment surgery in
Denmark and caused a "media sensation" in 1953.59 By the 1940s, the term "trans-
sexual" appeared in American medical discourse.60 Dr. Harry Benjamin further pop-
ularized the term transsexual during this time as published in his seminal text, The
Transsexual Phenomenon, in 1966.61 Although surveys did not exist then, the size of
the adult U.S. transgender-identified population is currently about 1.4 million, with
a recent federal study estimating that approximately 1.8% of all high school students
identify as transgender, and an additional 1.6% responded that they were unsure.62
Gender Expression 1 (2014), http://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/transgender.pdf; Levasseur, supra
note 43, at 951.
56 Blackless et al., supra note 28, at 151.
57 Id. at 159. To the extent that surveys of non-binary identity more broadly are only now
being introduced, 35% of Americans between ages 13 and 21 say that they know someone who
prefers to use gender neutral pronouns. Kim Parker et al., Generation Z Looks a Lot Like Millennials
on Key Social and Political Issues 4, PEW RES. CTR. (an. 17, 2019), https://www.pewsocialtrends.
org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2019/01/Generations-full-reportFINAL_1.18.pdf. NCTE's
historic survey of 27,715 transgender individuals in the U.S. reflected that 31% of respondents
identified as non-binary. Sandy E. James et al., The Report of the 20/5 U.S. Transgender Study, NAT'L
CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. 4, 44 (updated Dec. 2016) [hereinafter 20/5 U.S. Transgender
Surey].
58 Seegeneraly Adams ex rel. Kasper v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cty., 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 1299,
1325 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (citing WPATH standards and holding Title IX sex discrimination
encompasses exclusion of binary transgender student from common school restrooms and locker
rooms aligned with gender identity); MEYEROWITZ, supra note 52, at 7-9; WORLD PROF. ASS'N
FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL,
TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER-NONCONFORMING PEOPLE (7th ed. 2011); Levasseur, supra note
43, at 947.
59 Dallas Denny, Transgender Communities of the United States in the Late Twentieth Century, in
TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 174-75 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006); see, e.g., Ben White, Ex-GIBecomes
Blonde Beau): Operations Transform Bronx Youth, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 1, 1952, at 1.
60 David O. Cauldwell, Psychopathia Transsexualis, in THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER
40, 41-43 (Susan Stryker & Stephen Whittle eds., 2006). See supra note 9 for a discussion of the
reasons the term is now disfavored.
61 HARRY BENJAMIN, THE TRANSSEXUAL PHENOMENON 13 (1966).
62 Andrew R. Flores et al., How Many Adults Identify as Transgender in the United States? 3
WILLIAMS INST. (June 2016), https://wiliamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/
How-Many-Adults-Identify-as-Transgender-in-the-United-States.pdf (estimating size of adult
transgender population as 0.6 %, of all U.S. adults); Michelle M. Johns et al., Transgender Identi and
Expeences of Violence Victimation, Substance Use, Suicide Risk, and Sexual Risk Behaviors Among High
School Students - /9 States and Dirge Urban School District, 20/7, 68 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
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Thus, medical science's extensive discussions regarding sex determination and
its components reflect knowledge of natural variation in human sex as a widespread
discourse. Put differently, those arguing original public meaning or original legisla-
tive intent must not only overcome issues with collective attribution when opinions
are diffuse, which alone could end the debate. They need also contend with scien-
tific and public knowledge at the time regarding considerable sexual variation. Ra-
ther than "updating" statutory construction with twenty-first century meanings of
"sex," what the post-2015 correction did was acknowledge already existing com-
plexity and typographies that serve as functions of "sex,"63 while rejecting a narrow
biological view as dispositive and non-neutral.64
The notion that "sex" is a fixed binary trait arises from the medically inaccurate
view that it is strictly determined by "biological" factors such as sexual and repro-
ductive anatomy and chromosomes.65 This approach has been consistent with ju-
rists conforming their interpretation of "sex" with a state-administered sex binary66
and a dyadic, heteronormative framing of sexuality.67 Yet at least 9 million Ameri-
cans (3.5%) of the population identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual; about 19 million
(8.2%) report that they have engaged in same-sex sexual behavior; and, despite some
courts' strict equation of desire with identity status, nearly 25.6 million (11%) more
acknowledge at least some same-sex sexual attraction.68 Greenberg cogently sum-
marized prevailing social presumptions about sex and the related roles of sexual
orientation, gender presentation, and gender identity in the United States as a cas-
cading syllogism flowing from "biological" identification of sex:
WKLY. REP., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 67, 68 (2019) (relying upon survey
instrument that provided only male, female, and transgender as options, however).
63 Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 112 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) ("Title VII
prohibits not just discrimination based on sex itself, but also discrimination based on traits that
are a function of sex.").
64 Seegeneraly Brief of Law & History Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent
at 6-31, R.G. & G.R Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 18-107)
(discussing how "sex" was understood to implicate transgender individuals before Title VII's
passage, and understood by subsequent Congresses amending the statute); Ulane I, 581 F. Supp.
at 825 ("[S]ex is not a cut-and-dried matter of chromosomes, and ... as used in any scientific
sense and as used in the statute can be and should be reasonably interpreted to include among its
denotations the question of sexual identity and that, therefore, transsexuals are protected by Title
VII."); Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 211-13 (D.D.C. 2006) (recognizing science
may not view sex as "a cut-and-dried matter of chromosomes" but rather consists of "different
components of biological sexuality." (quoting Ulane 1)).
65 Julie A. Greenberg, The Roads Less Traveled: The Problem with Binay Sex Categories, in
TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 51, 52 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006); see also infra notes 69-74 and
accompanying text.
66 Mary C. Dunlap, The Constitutional Rights of Sexual Minorities: A Crisis of the Male/Female
Dichotomy, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1131, 1147-48 (1979).
67 Gary J. Gates, How Many People are Lesbian, Gay, Bisexua, and Transgender?, WILLIAMS INST.
2 (Apr. 2011), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Gates-How-Many-
People-LGBT-Apr-2011.pdf.
68 Id. at l.
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Table 1: Assumptions Regarding Sex-Linked Traits & Stigmatized Deviations69




Sexual/ Reproduc- penis, scrotum, testi- clitoris, labia, Intersex individuals
/ive Anatom cles, vagina, uterus,
XY chromosomes fallopian tubes,
XX
chromosomes
Sexual Orienta- Toward women Toward men Gay, lesbian, bisex-
tion ual, and others not
consistently hetero-
sexual
Gender Presenta- Masculine Feminine Individuals per-
tion/ Gender Role ceived as failing to
conform to sex ste-
reotypes





The table reflects syllogisms flowing from sexual "biology" (row 1) and all suc-
cessive assumptions (within each column, rows 2 through 4). This Article has mod-
ified Column 4 to underscore the animus directed toward those whose lives dis-
prove or contradict any of these syllogisms. Those who do not conform to the
syllogisms in both directions (rows 1 through 4, or rows 4 through 1) are vulnerable
to stigma in the workplace based upon these characteristics linked by definition to
the protected trait of sex.
For sexual orientation, the syllogism between anatomy and sexual orientation
(rows 1 to 2) was ingrained well before Title VII's enactment. Since mid-century,
raising children with intersex characteristics under heteronormative presumptions
has been a predominant approach.70 By the 1960s, assigning children and adults to
69 JULIE A. GREENBERG, INTERSEXUALITY AND THE LAW 3 (2012) (Table 1 modified in part
to expand inclusivity). "Non-binary" as used in this Article refers to people who do not exclusively
identify as male or female, including those who identify as genderqueer, having a gender other
than male or female, no gender, or more than one gender. See also Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them,
and Theirs, 132 HARV. L.J. 894, 905-33 (2019) (discussing the diversity of non-binary gender
identities and overlaps and divergences with other civil rights struggles). "Gender fluid" as used
in this Article refers to a person who does not identify with a single fixed gender, and who has or
expresses a fluid or unfixed gender identity. See Genderfluid, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d
ed. 2004).
70 REIS, supra note 52, at 142. Categorizing people strictly along either-or sex lines has
justified involuntary surgery in as many as 2 per 1,000 Americans. Blackless et al., supra note 28,
at 161.
2020] 745
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
only male or female sex became the paradigm of U.S. medical practice, one that
continues often unchallenged.71 The persistence of binary sex ideology is attributa-
ble to the influential guidelines promulgated by Johns Hopkins University psycholo-
gists John Money and Joan G. and John Hampson that were heterocentric, consist-
ently linking sexual and gender identity with a presumed heterosexuality.72 Thus,
hostility and stigma toward individuals because they are not heterosexual is inextri-
cable from their "biological" sex (row 1).73
A dimorphic definition is, more accurately, a persistent metaphor for sex roles
and sexuality,74 which some jurists mistake as a complete identity between the law,
Christianity, and science.75 For decades, harsh governmental measures punished
sexual minorities by criminalizing same-sex intimacy, and denying familial rights and
other basic social recognition and benefits to those who did not conform to heter-
osexual expectations.76 The importance of workplace equality is clear as most Amer-
icans depend on some combination of three sources of income-the labor market,
family, and the government-and sexual minorities have faced outright exclusion
or abuse from these sources of support.77
71 ALICE DOMURAT DREGER, HERMAPHRODITES AND THE MEDICAL INVENTION OF SEX
181-82 (1998). But see U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment orpunishment, Juan E. Mende, 18, 20, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/53
(Feb. 1, 2013) (classifying nonconsensual genital "normalizing" surgery on intersex children as a
form of ill-treatment, and declaring such surgeries "often . .. arguably meet the criteria for torture,
and they are always prohibited by international law"); M. Joycelyn Elders et al., Re-Thinking Genital
Surgeries on Intersex Infants, PALM CTR. (une 2017) (former U.S. Surgeons General Joycelyn Elders,
David Satcher, and Richard Carmona conclude that genital surgeries "violate an individual's right
to personal autonomy over their own future.").
72 REIS, supra note 52, at 141-42.
73 Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 112 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (concluding
that "sexual orientation discrimination is motivated, at least in part, by sex and is thus a subset of
sex discrimination"); Hively v. Ivy Tech Comm. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 345-47 (7th Cir.
2017) (en banc) (discussing comparative method testing for role of sex in bias based upon sexual
orientation); id. at 346-47 (reasoning that policy "based on assumptions about the proper behavior
for someone of a given sex ... does not exist without taking the victim's biological sex (either
observed at birth or as modified, in the case of transsexuals) into account").
74 Katherine Franke made a similar observation with respect to the metaphorical
relationship between biology and stigma. Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex
Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1995).
75 See Eskridge, Sexual and Gender Variation in American Public Law, supra note 44, at 1337
(describing how "sexual impulses and gender roles were thought to be tied descrjtivey (as a matter
of nature) and prescngtivey (as a matter of God-given natural law rules) to one's status as a
man/woman, husband/wife, and father/mother[,]" particularly as of the colonial era and early
nineteenth century) (emphasis in original).
76 A full history is beyond the scope of this Article and has been covered in depth in prior
scholarship. See, e.g., Eskridge, Sexual and Gender Variation in American Public Law, supra note 44, at
1336-49; Law, supra note 28, at 188-94.
77 Employment, poverty, and race are inextricably linked. See Burt Neuborne, Bebe
Anderson, Peggy Cooper Davis & Richard Blum, Achieving Results - Lessons from Civil Rights
Movements: Transcnt, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 509, 530 (2016) (remarks of Richard Blum,
cofounder of Queers for Economic Justice and Legal Aid Society attorney); Levasseur, supra note
43, at 945-46; Systems of Inequali): Pover) & Homelessness, SYLVIA RIVERA LAW PROJECT, http://
srlp.org/files/disproportionate-poverty.pdf (last visited July 12, 2020) (diagram of multiple forces
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By 1964, sex was understood to be complex and capable of change over time
by individuals and society. Congressional amendments in 1972, 1978, and 1991 reset
normative baselines for Title VII by acknowledging its goal of eliminating inequality,
reviewing the contemporaneous meaning of the statutory scheme with each amend-
ment against that purpose.78 Courts within the post-2015 doctrinal correction ad-
vance neutrality by analyzing social traits as socially pluralistic and intersubjective,
rather than simply adopting the harasser's view of plaintiff's sex or other traits.
B. The Rise of Title VII Classification and Sex Stereotyping
After Title VII's passage, judges unduly narrowed the law's reach by applying
the anti-classification paradigm from constitutional law. Relying on ideas about "bi-
ological" differences between men and women, the Supreme Court had justified
less searching constitutional review of government classifications by creating "in-
termediate" scrutiny for sex, in comparison to race, which received strict scrutiny.79
Title VII's language, however, does not assign different methodologies among the
five protected traits. By the 1970s, the Court nevertheless treated Title VII as a class-
based statute despite the lack of any basis for doing so.80 Sorting people into limited
classes neatly elided with societal prejudice against sexual variation and in favor of
an isomorphic, binary view of sex.81
comprising "interlocking system" that perpetuate inequality and vulnerability for many
transgender and gender non-conforming individuals). For example, nearly one-third of
transgender people live in poverty, more than twice the rate of the U.S. general population. The
unemployment rate is three times that of the overall U.S. unemployment rate. Among transgender
people of Latino, American Indian, Black, and multiracial descent, the situation is more dire, with
rates of poverty three times the overall U.S. population, and unemployment rates four times as
high. 20/5 U.S. Transgender Suvey, supra note 57, at 5-6.
78 Eskridge, Title VII's Statutory History, supra note 41, at 403 (describing Title VII as a statute
requiring "faithful attention to the textual and legislative evolution of the law" as authoritatively
amended by Congress).
9 Holly A. Williams, Reaching Across Difference: Extending Equali 's Reach to Encompass
Governmental Programs That Soley Benefit Vomen, 13 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 375, 390-92 (2006)
(discussing tension between discredited opinions such as Geduldig v. Aiello, Michael M. v.
Superior Court, Rotsker v. Goldberg); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 50, at 766 (noting issues
"whenever the Court purports to rely on biological differences as a justification for differences in
treatment, are whether these differences are real or social constructs and whether they should
matter").
80 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (excluding reference to classification as a prohibited
practice), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (referring to "classify[ing]" individuals adversely as only
one of several prohibited practices).
81 See supra Table 1; f Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 336-37 (1987) ("Cognitivists see the process of
"categorization" as one common source of racial and other stereotypes. All humans tend to
categorize in order to make sense of experience. . .. When [] the category of black person or white
person-correlates with [beliefs regarding] the range of human intelligence or the propensity to
violence-there is a tendency to exaggerate the differences between categories on that dimension
and to minimize the differences within each category." (citing studies from 1952-1977)).
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Class-based analysis is the hallmark of formal equality, as it rejects evidence of
material, substantive inequality occurring outside of group contexts.82 For Title VII,
a substantive approach to sex discrimination arrived in the form of a legislative re-
buke in 1978.83 Intersectionality theorists thereafter criticized such reductive and
compartmentalized approaches to evidence, particularly in race and sex discrimina-
tion cases.84 The class-based paradigm is nonetheless the most influential basis for
rejecting sexual minorities' claims today. "Sexual orientation is not on the list of
forbidden categories of employment discrimination," Judge Sykes contended in her
Hivey dissent.85 And, citing his own "broader political and social history" of work-
place sex discrimination, Judge Lynch's dissent in Zarda asserted that "actual bio-
logical or genetic differences" in sex justify treating it differently from "races" (the
latter of which, he conceded, can be defined "socially"). 86
1. Categorical Formalism
Sex's belated treatment as socially defined can be attributed to categorical for-
malism courts imposed despite any statutory command for this approach. Early
treatment of Title VII as a formal-equality scheme led prominent scholars to under-
theorize the statute and its history. William Eskridge adopts a slightly broader view
in saying that Title VII is "not simply class-based legislation" but operates as "classi-
fication-based legislation." 87 This describes the Court's more restrained common-law
approaches, but does not contend with the statutory provisions as a whole, its pur-
pose, or how trial court judges who decide workplace civil rights claims understand
their capacity to analyze facts.88
The more limited meaning historically attributed to sex discrimination reveals
the close, intentional development of constitutional jurisprudence horizontally into
Title VII cases. The Court sought to remediate centuries of harmful sex-based
norms by declaring, in 1973, that "sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable
82 See SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE 106-43 (2011) (discussing initial feminist
legal strategies in the 1970s that pursued formal equality and, later, more expansive contextual and
structural discrimination theories of sex discrimination).
83 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978), discussed
infra notes 102-03.
84 See generally discussion infra Part II.C; cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics I, supra note
32, at 501; Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginaliing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidisiminatory Doctine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
139, 140, 144-45 (1989) (illustrating how "dominant conceptions of discrimination condition us
to think about subordination as disadvantage occurring along a single categorical axis[]" and the
norming of white women's experiences in the doctrine). More recently, scholars have critiqued
courts' overreliance on classes to summarily dismiss sexual minorities' sex discrimination claims.
E.g., Jessica A. Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. REv. 101, 104 (2017); Leora F.
Eisenstadt, Fluid Identity Discrimination, 52 AM. Bus. L.J. 789, 793 (2015).
85 Hively v. Ivy Tech Comm. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 360 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(Sykes, J., dissenting).
86 Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 149 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Lynch, J.,
dissenting).
87 E.g., Eskridge, Title VII's Statutory History, supra note 41, at 342-43 (emphasis in original).
88 See discussion infra Part IIA.
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characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth."89 This articulation of
"sex"-from Frontiero v. Richardson, an Equal Protection case involving the male
spouse of a servicewoman receiving fewer benefits than female spouses-had an
immediate and lasting hold on workplace law. Yet the case that launched represen-
tation-reinforcement heory, U.S. v. Carolene Products, never actually used the term
"immutable."90 Courts then inferred the exclusion of sexual minorities from repre-
sentation-reinforcement theory as a political or moral choice, rather than a substan-
tive one.91 The Court's insistence on treating immutability as an element, rather than
a factor, in recognizing "new" rights then became hitched to Title VII doctrine.92
Essentialist definitions of sex as immutable, biological classes reflected entrenched
norms of courts and litigators pursuing formal, group-based equality objectives of
sameness in treatment (i.e., only as "between the sexes").93
Insisting on all-women versus all-men comparisons, the Burger Court pro-
ceeded to impose this anti-classificationist approach in two opinions addressing
pregnancy: Geduldig v. Aiello, an equal protection case,94 and General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, a Title VII sex discrimination case.95 In 1974, the Aiello Court held preg-
nancy-based distinctions did not constitute sex discrimination because the distinc-
tion was not limited to all women.96 The Court doubled down two years later in
Gilbert, reverse-engineering a claim that Congress intended Title VII to track con-
stitutional interpretations of sex:
While there is no necessary inference that Congress, in choosing this language,
intended to incorporate into Title VII the concepts of discrimination which have
evolved from court decisions construing the Equal Protection Clause of the
89 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). As the scholarship acknowledges, race
is considered a social, rather than biological or genetic construct. Alice Littlefield et al., Redefining
Race: The Potential Demise of a Concept in PhysicalAnthropology, 23 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 641,
641 (1982) (noting a complete shift in anthropological textbooks by the 1970s); Greene, supra note
21, at 133; Ian Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication,
and Choice, 29 HARv. C.R. & C.L. L. REv. 1, 6 (1994).
90 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 305 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). Janet Halley has
shown that the text of footnote four of Carolene Products does not use the word "immutable," and
argues that at best, it should be treated as a non-essential factor. Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation
and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argumentfrom Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503, 509-10
(1994). On the evolving conceptions of legal immutability, see Leora F. Eisenstadt, Fluid Identity
Discrimination, 52 AM. Bus. L.J. 789, 839 (2015).
91 William N. Eskridge, Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democragy by Lowering
the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1288-89 (2005) (citing ELY, supra note 50, at 170-72). The
turning point, of course, was Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
92 In an early interpretation imagining immutability to be an element of Title VII, an
appellate court held: "Equal employment opportuni) may be secured only when employers are
barred from discriminating against employees on the basis of immutable characteristics, such as
race and national origin." Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th
Cir. 1975) (emphasis in original).
93 See Cary Franklin, Inventing the 'Traditional Concept" of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARv. L. REv.
1307, 1365 (2012) [hereinafter Franklin, Inventing the 'Traditional Concept']; Abrams, supra note 26,
at 2480-81.
94 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974).
9s Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 130 (1976).
96 Aiello, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20.
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Fourteenth Amendment, the similarities between the congressional language and some of
those decisions sur inite that the later are a useful starting point in in/epreting the for-
mer.9
But Gilberts interpretive elision of the public/private doctrine was a fiction.
The division arises from distinct sources of legal authority and justification and is
politically fraught. Title VII's ability to reach private decision-making lies in the
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.98 The Constitution
provides a baseline of rights where governmental policies target specific population
groups for benefit or ill. In Equal Protection doctrine the government is afforded
some presumption of deference in its actions, unlike private defendants in work-
place law.99
In Title VII, Congress tasked courts with eliminating bias against "any individ-
ual" in the labor market. Thus, the Gilbert Court unjustifiably interpreted the statute
to only prohibit employers from engaging in blunt pigeonholing.00 Indeed, scarcely
six months prior to Gilbert the Court proclaimed in Washington v. Davis that it had
"neverheld that the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of invidious racial
discrimination is identical to the standards applicable under Title VII[.]"' 0 '
Congress made clear the Justices had gotten it wrong. In 1978, lawmakers
passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA") with comments in the record
that the Gilbert Court "disregarded the intent of Congress in enacting Title VII." 0 2
They also inscribed in the statutory definitions section an amendment hat "because
97 Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 133 (emphasis added).
98 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 249 (1964); id. at 292-93 (Goldberg., J., concurring) (noting
Congress's authority to enact Title VII resides in the Fourteenth Amendment, in addition to the
Commerce Clause); f Nev. Dep't of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727 (2003) (upholding
constitutional authority for the Family and Medical Leave Act, interpreting "Congress' [§ 5] power
'to enforce' the [Fourteenth] Amendment [to] include[] the authority both to remedy and to deter
violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct,
including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text.").
99 A helpful reprisal of state action deference, as a policy matter, appeared in Murillo v.
Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898, 901-02 (3d Cir. 1982):
[I]n the course of several decades of constitutional litigation, the equal protection standard
has come to be thought of as primarily two-tiered: enactments that discriminate against sus-
pect classes or trench upon fundamental rights are disfavored, and will be tolerated only if
necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest, while statutes in the economic,
social welfare, or regulatory fields are subjected to far lesser scrutiny. . . . With respect to a
statute challenged on equal protection grounds, therefore, [review must] carefully consider
whether a sufficient showing has been made . . . so as to override the presumption of con-
stitutionality ordinarily accorded to legislative pronouncements.
100 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
101 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 n.8, 239 (1976) (reversing the appellate court's
application of the broader intent standard for disparate racial impact in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), to an Equal Protection race case) (emphasis added).
102 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978);
Disc'mination on the Basis ofPregnan , 977: Hearing on S. 995 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm.
on Human Res., 95th Cong. 1 (1977) (statement of Sen. Harrison Williams, Chairman, Subcomm.
on Labor).
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of sex" included "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,"0 3 all of
which are mutable sex-linked traits.
Appellate courts nonetheless continued to exclude sexual minorities' employ-
ment claims by reasoning that the animus they faced did not involve wholesale clas-
sification. In the absence of legislative history determinative of this issue,104 they
surmised that Title VII prohibited employers only from "discriminat[ing] against
women because they are women and against men because they are men" (Ulane
I1),105 or that plaintiffs failed to prove harm tied to a "traditional binary conception
of sex" (Etsitty v. Utah TransitAuthoriy).106 Adopting the view that transgender status
is blameworthy, Ulane II cast Ms. Ulane into an unprotected "class of people ...
discontent with the sex into which they were born."1 07 Thus, outright hostility based
upon a change in sex could never be discrimination because of sex.
Early rulings that rejected status-based claims by gay, lesbian plaintiffs then
relied on the lines of cases that excluded transgender plaintiffs based on the grounds
that only mutable conduct was at issue. Although the PDA's passage the year prior
disapproved class-wide favoritism theory as the only approach to workplace dis-
crimination, appellate courts still held that sex was a "traditional" concept that could
not be "extended to include sexual preference." 08 This approach contradicted the
advice that LGBT advocates sought and received from the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission during the 1960s and 70s. The Commission was receptive to
their sex discrimination claims, inviting and adjudicating them.109 Similarly, during
103 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). Although the statutory definitions section does not refer to
any other forms of discrimination as "because of sex"-e.g., sex stereotyping, hostile work
environment, sexual assault, or sexual harassment-the foregone viability of these forms of
disadvantaging individuals unfairly because of sex does not raise congressional intent questions,
and circuits have held the same as to sexual minorities. See, e.g., Doe ex red. Doe v. Boyertown Area
Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 526, 533 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2636 (2019); Harris Funeral
Homes v. EEOC, 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018); Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, 883 F.3d 100 (2d
Cir. 2018).
104 As scholars have long noted, divining legislative intent for the term "sex" or "because of
sex" is an unhelpful inquiry given that there were no committee reports or legislative hearings on
the issue. E.g., Franklin, Inventing the Traditional Concept," supra note 93, at 1318.
105 Ulane II, 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).
106 Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007) ("such protection
extends to transsexual employees only if they are discriminated against because they are male or
because they are female.").
107 Ulane II, 742 F.2d at 1085-86 (citing Gunnison v. Comm'r, 461 F.2d 496, 499 (7th Cir.
1972)). In an early attempt to plumb the limits of employment law, Owen Fiss outlined the
"attribute" of race as immutable class membership and outside of individual agency to establish
the unfairness of race discrimination. See Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U.
CHI. L. REv. 235, 241 (1971) ("To judge an individual on the basis of his race is to judge him on
the basis of his membership [that] is truly predetermined. Individual control is a value because ...
it rationalizes, and thus makes more tolerable, the unequal distribution of status and wealth among
people in the society: failure is the individual's own fault.").
108 E.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 330 (9th Cir. 1979).
109 Brief of Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of Employees at 22-29, R.G. & G.R.
Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 17-1618); Altitude Express, Inc. v.
Zarda, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 17-1623); Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No.
18-107).
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this time, Phyllis Schlafly prominently argued that enacting the Equal Rights
Amendment would mean that same-sex marriage would become legal and that dis-
crimination against homosexuals would become illegal." 0
By the late 1990s, the Court continued to struggle with broader substantive
definitions of harm ostensibly because they suspiciously regarded Title VII as a har-
binger of Equal Protection doctrine. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Oil Services, the
Court rejected a pure anti-classification approach to Title VII in famously holding:
"We see no justification in the statutory language or our precedents for a categorical
rule excluding same-sex harassment claims from the coverage of Title VII.""
However, tensions between anti-classification theories and anti-subordination the-
ories were apparent in a discussion ostensibly provided for the benefit of lower
courts, since the examples discussed had little to do with the facts of Mr. Oncale's
sexual abuse on an all-male oil rig.
Writing for the Court,Justice Scalia provided some examples of discrimination
"because of. . . sex" in the form of hypotheticals that appear to obscure Title VII's
trait and causation elements. Invoking the non-statutory language of "reasonable-
ness," Oncale's discussion begins with a view that the "inference of discrimination
[is] easy to draw in most male-female sexual harassment situations [as] it is reason-
able to assume" the harm would not have occurred "to someone of the same
sex."" 2 But, the Court said, such an inference in another situation would be reason-
able "if there were credible evidence the harasser was homosexual."' "3 Alternatively,
noting that sexual harassment need not be motivated by sexual desire, a female who
harassed another woman with "sex-specific and derogatory terms" reveals that she
is "motivated by hostility to the presence of women in the workplace.""4 Finally, a
same-sex harassment plaintiff "may also, of course, offer direct comparative evi-
dence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes[.]"" 5
In light of the facts of Mr. Oncale's particular case, the illustrative routes above
restated heterogeneous groupings of two sexes without quite illustrating why "same-
sex" harrassment is prohibited; rather the routes highlighted male-female sexual
misconduct as providing "reasonable" inferences of sexual desire as a motive,"1 6
and used comparative group favoritism to prove differential treatment (i.e., men
over women or vice versa)." 7 But its pronouncements that sexual desire was not
required for causation, and that intra-group harm may be actionable, ultimately pre-
served Title VII's reach as an anti-subordination statute.'18 In Bostoc, the Court
110 See Cary Franklin, The Anti -Stereotyping Prinaiple in Constitutional Sex Disenmination Law, 85
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 83, 140-41 (2010) (historicizing links between sex-role stereotyping arguments
during the 1970s in connection with lesbian and gay activism and constitutional litigation
strategies) (citing PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY, THE POWER OF THE POSITIVE WOMAN 90 (1977)).
111 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
112 Id at 80.
113 Id
114 Id
115 Id at 80-81.
116 Id at 80.
117 Id
118 Id (providing four evidentiary routes as "example[s]" of sex-based harassment).
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held true to its word in Oncale that the four routes were non-exclusive and new
theories of sex-based subordination could be articulated.119
A year after Oncale, three Justices balked at an anti-subordination approach in
Olmstead v. L C., an Equal Protection and disability discrimination action against the
state of Georgia.120 The Olmstead dissent rejected a substantive view of inequality
and claimed "differential treatment vis-a-vis members of a different group" must
always be alleged in every kind of discrimination case, including statutory discrimina-
tion claims.'2 ' Concerns that the state treasury would be vulnerable to contextual
claims of discrimination also seemed to animate much of the dissent.2 2 The for-
malist Justices misguidedly asserted that both Title VII and Equal Protection doc-
trines must move in interpretive lockstep.
The import of this history is that the only consistent approach is to treat con-
stitutional rights as the lower boundary of rights, and not as a ceiling, to contextual
Title VII analysis.123 A failure to extend causation analysis beyond classification
would produce anomalous outcomes in discrimination claims brought by state em-
ployees. Because Title VII applies to state and local governments as employers,
companion Section 1983 claims may be brought on the same facts.2 4 After Oberge-
fell, courts became susceptible to the challenge that they, as the state, impermissibly
exclude claims based upon sexual orientation by selectively denying those plaintiffs
equal Title VII coverage.2 5 The same has been held to be discriminatory state action
against transgender plaintiffs.126 For a state employee who may enter into a same-
119 See id. at 81; Bostock v. Clayton Cty., No. 17-1618, slip op. at 2 (590 U.S. __ (2020))
(holding that "[a]n employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires
that person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex")
(emphasis added).
120 Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 598 (1999).
121 Id. at 616 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
122 Id
123 Justice O'Connor cautioned the Court to avoid an outcome that treats private
discrimination substantively better than public discrimination in Price Waterhouse: "I simply cannot
believe that Congress intended Title VII to accord more deference to a private employer [than to
the government] in the face of evidence that its decisional process has been substantially infected
by discrimination." Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 269 (plurality opinion)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). The Court rejected imposing only the constitutional standard upon
Title VII, in the affirmative action context. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009); United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara
Cty., Cal., 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
124 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5-17 (2012).
125 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (announcing its holding rested on
both Due Process and Equal Protection grounds); see, e.g., Christiansen v. Omnicom, 167 F. Supp.
3d 598, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (calling for reconsideration of exclusion of discrimination based
upon sexual orientation as irreconcilable with Court opinion in United States v. Vindsor and
Obergefel). Courts may still have trouble seeing lesbians, gays, or bisexuals independently of
male/female binary "classes" facing differential treatment, often granting favorable outcomes in
cases with facts centered around effeminate appearance but rejecting those in which homosexual
status is "known" (i.e., actual membership in a "class"). See Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals:
Looking Gay Enoughfor Title VII, 63 AM. U. L. REv. 715, 718 (2014).
126 See Karnoski v. Trump, 926 F.3d 1180, 1202 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (determining
that defense department policy barring transgender troops from military service as gender-based
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sex marriage under Equal Protection, but is unprotected from sex discrimination
when a boss disapproves of the news under a workplace Equal Protection claim, a
worse outcome for the latter could not be reconciled.
Categorical formalism provides the semblance of fairness, universality, and in-
evitability. But classification is not the only discrimination Title VII recognizes.
Courts that disfavor the sex of sexual minorities rely on this judge-made rule
through stare decisis, without more.12 7 Those within the post-2015 wave fortunately
challenged precedent for precedent's sake, and the Bostock Court took heed, citing
precedent only sparsely in re-envisioning Title VII's reach as expansive.
2. Sex Stereotyping as a Species of Classification
Anti-stereotyping theory applied to Title VII has largely functioned as a species
of classification.128 In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court expressly in-
terpreted "sex" to encompass Congress's intent to forbid employers from "tak[ing]
gender into account" in their decisions.129 There, Ann Hopkins, a white senior ac-
counting manager, alleged that she was denied a promotion to partner because she
was considered "macho" and "overcompensated for being a woman." The firm told
Ms. Hopkins that she would have to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely,
dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."130 six
Justices agreed that the comments indicated discrimination based upon sex. Here,
her employer penalized her for conduct and appearance defying its expectations of
her sex.131 Justice Kennedy, a seventh, agreed that sex-stereotyping evidence is
"quite relevant to the question of discriminatory intent" in his dissent.132
classification subject to intermediate scrutiny); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir.
2011) (holding, in § 1983 action, that transgender state employee proved her firing violated the
Equal Protection Clause because "perceived gender nonconformity" is sex-based discrimination
reviewable under heightened scrutiny); see also Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 574 (6th Cir.
2004) (holding that disqualifying claim based upon transgender status from Title VII would
"superimpose classifications such as 'transsexual' ... and then legitimize discrimination . . . by
formalizing the non-conformity into an ostensibly unprotected classification"); Fabian v. Hosp.
of Cent. Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 523 n.8 (D. Conn. 2016); Adkins v. City of New York, 143
F. Supp. 3d 134, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
127 Because there is no legislative history for the addition of "sex" to Title VII just before
passage, other than the (disputed) notion that it was a "joke" to scuttle the bill, courts must look
elsewhere. Franklin, Inventing the 'Traditional Concept," supra note 93, at 1319 n.42; see also Currah &
Minter, supra note 28, at 39-40 ("For the most part, transgender people have not been excluded
from civil rights protections because of conceptual or philosophical failures in legal reasoning,
but rather because they have not been viewed as worthy of protection or, in some cases, even as
human.").
128 Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatoy Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REv. 519, 544 (2018) (noting
antistereotyping theory "requires that individuals not be held to or judged against stereotypes
associated with any protected classes" and calling it a "subspecies of anticlassification"); cf
Eskridge, Title VIIs Statutory History, supra note 41, at 343 (characterizing Title VII as "not simply
class-based legislation [but] classification based legislation") (emphasis in original).
129 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (plurality opinion).
130 Id. at 235.
131 Id.; id. at 260-61 (White, J., concurring); id. at 272-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
132 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 294-95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (disagreeing instead with
the conclusion in the trial record and fundamentally disagreeing that the causation standard is the
tort-like "but-for" causation).
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This view of sex, that Ms. Hopkins's employer unlawfully punished her for
failing to act "like a woman," broke new ground in recognizing sex as a socially
pluralistic trait.133 By restoring Title VII from the hold of group-based essentialism,
Price Waterhouse made it possible to argue that protected traits may be socially con-
structed. Thus, evidence of disfavoring a characteristic linked to a protected trait,
here gender linked to sex, could meet the statutory trait element and allow a plaintiff
to establish causation in an employment decision.134 In 1991, lawmakers passed the
Civil Rights Act to clarify Title VII's causation standard as broad, but left the sub-
stantive sex-stereotyping holding of Price Waterhouse intact. 135 As it did in the 1978
PDA, lawmakers underscored the Court's error in failing to provide "adequate pro-
tection" to workers.136 Thus Congress approved of Price Waterhouse's other holdings,
which would include the socially pluralistic view of sex discrimination that does not
hinge upon comparisons of all women "versus" all men.
Price Waterhouse's articulation of sex stereotyping evidence provided the theo-
retical foundation for a supermajority of appellate courts to recognize that animus
against those identified as lesbian, gay, or transgender can experience sex discrimi-
nation based upon sex stereotypes137 (e.g., when a person fails to conform to gender
stereotype by being attracted to the "wrong gender").138 Contemporary sex-stereo-
typing theory also reflects incipient multiaxial analysis by requiring courts to inter-
rogate the perpetrator's conceptions of "sex" as potentially invidious stereotypes
without upholding the perpetrator's classifications as valid. Read most broadly, Price
Waterhouse's admonition that "gender must be irrelevant" to employment decisions
means that a policy that "all workers would be fired unless they adhered to tradi-
tional [binary male or female] gender roles" would no doubt be unlawful.139
133 Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that prior decisions
limiting sex to only anatomical or chromosomal sex were "eviscerated by Price Waterhouse.").
134 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251-52; see also id. ("By focusing on Hopkins' specific proof,
however, we do not suggest a limitation on the possible ways of proving that stereotyping played
a motivating role in an employment decision[.]").
135 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). The bill's
sponsors articulated in committee reports that the bill only "overrules one aspect of the [Price
Waterhouse] decision." Eskridge, Title VIIs Statutory History, supra note 41, at 375 (citing H.R. REP.
No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 48 (1991)).
136 Eskridge, Title VII's Statutory History, supra note 41, at 376.
137 See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 120-23 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc); Hively
v. Ivy Tech Comm. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 346-47 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc); EEOC v. Boh
Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 457-60 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d
1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir. 2009);
Smith, 378 F.3d at 573; Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 870, 874-75 (9th Cir.
2001); Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 1999).
138 Zarda, 883 F.3d at 113-14; Hivey, 853 F.3d at 346, 350; see also Bostock v. Clayton Cty.
Bd. of Comm'rs, 894 F.3d 1335, 1339 (11th Cir. 2018) (mem.) (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting) (noting
the "considerable calisthenics" to explain why gender nonconformity claims are cognizable except
for when a person fails to conform to the "ultimate" gender stereotype by being attracted to the
"wrong" gender (quoting Hivey, 853 F.3d at 346, 350)).
139 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240; Brief of Anti-Discrimination Scholars in Support of the
Employees at 18-19, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No.
17-1618); Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 17-1623); Bostock v.
Clayton Cty., 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 18-107).
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However, sex-stereotyping theory and arguments are typically anchored to bi-
nary "biological" sex as a simplistic stand-in for the sex trait.140 Current articulations
of stereotyping theory tend to constrain readings of sex that acknowledge further
sexual variation,141 although law scholar amici in the Bostock trio of cases this Term
sought to fill the gap in the scholarship.142 After Price Waterhouse, courts interpreted
Title VII to reach both "sex" as physical differences between only men and women,
and "gender" as cultural attributes self- determined or ascribed by others.143 Most
judges and parties frame statutory "sex" as a binary "biological" classification that
preserves the practice. Indeed, the theory's origin story of a sex-gender mismatch led
many courts to misgender the transgender plaintiffs before them and reify "birth
sex" as biological sex, which the Bostock decision provisionally did.144 Its prevalence
creates the impression that sex stereotyping and the binary are necessarily linked
and leaves intact normative barriers for those who identify with communities that
include intersex, non-binary, agender, and gender-fluid, and renders less deliberative
the important dialogic relationships between legal institutions and society, including
social justice movements that advocate for politically vulnerable communities. Legal
theories that do not reflect lived experience reinstate and legitimize dominant views
of sex and gender,145 and allow institutions to persist in expressive harms against
minorities.146
140 See, e.g., Pce Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (holding Title VII "strike[s] at the entire spectrum
of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes." (quoting Los Angeles
Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978))); Smith, 378 F.3d at 573 (citing
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251) (holding transgender woman stated a sex stereotyping claim while
reasoning that "Title VII's reference to 'sex' encompasses both the biological differences between
men and women, and gender discrimination, that is, discrimination based on a failure to conform
to stereotypical gender norms").
141 See, e.g., Wood v. C.G. Studios, 660 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (citation omitted),
discussed infra Part III.B.2. As Janet Halley observed, even the terms "lesbian" and "gay" in legal
contexts exclude non-binary sexuality, such as those who identify as bisexual, and reinscribe
sexuality's link to binary identification. Halley, supra note 90, at 527.
142 Seegeneraly Brief of Law & History Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent
at 6-31, R.G. & G.R Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 18-107)
(discussing how "sex" was understood to implicate transgender individuals before Title VII's
passage, and understood by subsequent Congresses amending the statute); Brief of Anti-
Discrimination Scholars at 9, R.G. & G.R Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019)
(No. 18-107) ("[G]ay men and lesbians also do not adhere to the cluster of stereotypes that arise out of
the traditional expectation of different sex coupling." (emphasis added)).
143 See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama
ex red. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 157 n.1 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The word 'gender' has acquired
the new and useful connotation of cultural or attitudinal characteristics (as opposed to physical
characteristics) distinctive to the sexes.").
144 For example in Smith, the plaintiff, a transgender female firefighter, felt strategically
obliged to identify herself as a "male with Gender Identity Disorder" and seek sex-discrimination
protection as a man facing sex stereotyping. Smith, 378 F. 3d at 570; see supra note 35 (describing
Bostock's assumption arguendo of a limited "1964" definition of sex).
145 See Paisley Currah, Defending Genders: Sex and Gender- Nonconformip in the Civil Rights Strategies
of Sexual Minorities, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1363, 1364 (1997); Levasseur, supra note 43, at 1002-03.
146 Expressive harms "result[] from the ideas or attitudes expressed through a governmental
action." Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harm, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting
Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances after Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 506-07
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Scholars such as D. Wendy Greene have urged courts to recognize "misper-
ception" claims and reject employer "actuality defenses" as to race, national origin,
and religion, so that actual membership in a broad protected category is not re-
quired.147 The need to account for sexual diversity is no less pressing than for any
other civil rights trait.148 By comparison, hate crimes statutes have accounted for
invidious harms based upon one or more misperceived identities.149
To insist that sex stereotyping must be theorized beyond majoritarian view-
points is to require more of legal advocacy, as Darren Rosenblum's work has
raised.'5 0 Lesbian and gay employees' Title VII claims have generally been success-
ful under sex-stereotyping theory,'5 ' yet appellate courts in the post-2015 correction
seemed wary of relying upon it as a catch-all theory for sex-based subordination. In
Hively, the Seventh Circuit referred to stereotyping as subsidiary to the comparative
argument the decision advanced, rather than a standalone stereotyping frame.'5 2
Similarly, a majority of the Zarda court did not endorse the decision's sex
(1993); see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Jacob Willig-Onwuachi, A House Divided: The Invisibill
of the Multiracial Famiy, 44 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 231, 234-35 (2009) (describing the expressive
harm of current framing of housing discrimination statutes).
147 Greene, supra note 21, at 165-66; see also Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 21, at
1325, 1333-34, 1343.
148 Only a few commentators have been willing to critique Price Waterhouse's incomplete
theorizing of sex-stereotyping as discrimination. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 29, at 925-28;
Andrew Gilden, Toward a More Transformative Approach: The Limits of Transgender Formal Equali),
23 BERKELEYJ. GENDER L. &JUsT. 83, 100-01 (2008); Sharon M. McGowan, Working With Clients
to Develop Conpatible Visions of What It Means to "Win" a Case: Reflections on Schroer v. Billington, 45
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 205, 218 (2010) (recounting client Diane Schroer's reaction to her
counsel's potential sex-stereotyping argument as: "I haven't gone through all this only to have a
court vindicate my rights as a gender non-conforming man."). See generaly Clarke, Protected Class
Gatekeeping, supra note 84 (describing Price Waterhouse as one of several cases asking whether
different rules are separate but equal).
149 E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05(1) (McKinney 2019) ("A person commits a hate crime
when he or she commits a specified offense and either: (a) intentionally selects [their target] ...
or (b) intentionally commits the act or acts . . . in whole or in substantial part because of a belief
or perception regarding the race, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, gender identity or
expression, religion, religious practice, age, disability or sexual orientation of a person, regardless of
whether the belief or perception is correct.") (emphasis added).
150 Rosenblum, Queer Legal Victories, supra note 44, at 43 (arguing that "legal victories often
fail to translate into social change" because "cases that achieved their goals for the plaintiffs [still]
presented complications for other queer legal goals.").
1s1 See supra note 137 and accompanying text. By one estimate, sex-stereotyping has been
accepted by courts 76% of the time to support a viable sex discrimination theory. Raelynn J.
Hillhouse, Reframing the Argument: Sexual Orientation Discrimination Under Equal Protection, 20 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 49, 87-88 (2018).
152 Hively v. Ivy Tech Comm. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 345-47 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
Under this contemporary, stricter comparative theory, similarly situated men and women would
not be treated differently but for their sex. Although comparator evidence has traditionally been
treated as a potential form of circumstantial evidence by which a plaintiff can show that those
similarly situated were treated differently, increasing judicial demand for comparator evidence has
grown disproportionately, "sharply narrowing both the possibility of success for individual
litigants and, more generally, the very meaning of discrimination." Suzanne B. Goldberg,
Discrimination by Cozparson, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 734 (2011).
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stereotyping theory, apart from the touchstone point that sexual orientation is a
"function of sex."1 5 3 The en banc majorities may also have been concerned that a
selectively textualist Court would agree with the Hively and Zarda dissenters that
homophobia does not disadvantage either sex as a unitary class.'5 4
Although sex-stereotyping theory has supported rights-positive outcomes for
some, a narrow starting point for stereotypes conflicts with the dignitary interests
inherent in sexual self- determination.5 5 For example, as non-binary sex increasingly
gains formal recognition among states and localities, the question becomes: what is
the stereotype associated with non-binary sex or intersex individuals who identify
as non-binary?15 6 Sex stereotyping appears to be articulated to the extent the de-
fendant (the business firm or harasser) treats the individual's sex as only male or
female. Increasing use of the qualifier "birth" sex in recent decisions alleviates only
one problem with sex stereotyping for transgender litigants but sidesteps a broader
doctrinal correction in which the protected trait of "sex" acknowledges actual sexual
variation beyond a binary.5 7
Another concern is that sex-stereotyping analysis by courts and parties com-
monly universalize limited gender norms to the exclusion of race, class, geography,
and other determinants of social interaction. By contrast, social psychology recog-
nizes that sex has always been inherently racialized, then158 and now.159 Questions
153 Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 106-07, 112 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (eight
of twelve judges joining part II.A of majority opinion); id. at 119-23 (discussing sex-stereotyping
theory); see also Table 1, supra Part LA, and accompanying text.
154 Zarda, 883 F.3d at 158 (Lynch, J., dissenting) (citing Hively, 853 F.3d at 370); see also supra
note 19; f Brian Soucek, Queering Sexual Harassment Law, 128 YALE L.J.F. 67, 81 (2018) (arguing
that "gay men and lesbian respectively flout diferent gender stereotypes").
155 See infra Parts III, IIIB.
156 Non-binary gender markers are now available by law on some form of identification, or
have been granted to at least one person under court order, in the following twenty-one
jurisdictions: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Maine, Maryland,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Utah, Vermont, Washington, New York City, and District of Columbia. Resources: Non-Binay
Gender. Intersex., INTERSEX & QUEER RECOGNITION PROJECT, https://www.intersexrecognition.
org/resources (last visited Feb. 7, 2020) (noting initiatives underway in Arizona, Hawaii,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont) (last visited Feb. 7,
2020); see also Part IILA, infra (defining the government axis).
157 E.g., Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d at 567 (referring to transgender plaintiff- intervenor
as "assigned male at birth"); M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ. of Talbot Cty., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 708 n.3
(D. Md. 2018) (in Title IX case, with respect to transgender boy, "[t]he Court uses terms such as
'birth sex' to refer to gender designations made at birth.").
158 Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativi), Critical Race
Theory, and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 79-80 (1999) (reviewing published accounts and
statistical data regarding the use of sexualized violence against LGBT individuals of color to
further racial oppression).
159 Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Tamar Kricheli-Katz, Intersecting Cultural Beliefs in Social Relations:
Gender, Race, and Class Binds and Freedoms, 27 GENDER & SOC. 294, 298 (2013) (surveying social
cognition research into comparisons' powerful role in organizing social relations and evidence
"that people in the United States automatically and nearly instantly categorize . . . others on sex
and race on the basis of quite minimal cues[,]" with sex, race, and age as primary categories, and
institutional/occupation roles or contextual identities as additional categories).
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remain: How can stereotyping expressly account for the confluence of sex-based
identity with race and class? Can the unsolicited advice Ms. Hopkins received to
wear jewelry and talk femininely at her accounting firm translate to the occupational
culture that once caused the Utah Transit Authority to worry about the "image"
that its bus driver, Krystal Etsitty, presented to the public after she began to live
consistent with her gender identity?6 0 If not, then courts already make judgments
about which kinds of harm are socially verifiable, but without transparency.
II. "BECAUSE OF" SEX: TITLE VII CAUSATION
Recognizing that sex is inherently contextual and pluralistic explains sex dis-
crimination only in part. The embattled definitions of sex and sex discrimination
over the decades also turn upon Title VII's causation provision-that the harm
arose "because of' a protected trait. Part II.A provides a brief but critical overview
of the core provisions for causation. Part II.B then focuses on the evidentiary tests
the Court developed and how hegemonic frames improperly conflate trait identifi-
cation with causation in cases brought by minorities whose identities are deemed
less familiar.
A. An Overview of the Causation Provisions
For decades, Congress's decision to leave "discrimination" undefined allowed
courts to fashion rules that ignore the statute's anti-subordination goals. A recurring
definition from the Court since the 1980s is that of a social "evil."161 The Oncale
Court famously rejected legislative intent as an interpretive tool in order to conclude
that Title VII may "cover reasonably comparable evils" of the "principle evil[s]"
that concerned legislators.162 While powerful and imbued with morality, the invo-
cation of "evil" is mere rhetoric when it does no substantive work. Nearly a decade
prior, Justice O'Connor provided a clearer-broader-articulation of Title VII's
purposes in combatting stigma in Price Waterhouse:
There is no doubt that Congress considered reliance on gender or race in making
employment decisions an evil in itself ... Congress certainly was not blind to the
160 The Tenth Circuit in Etsity disagreed, and thus stereotyping theory would need to make
clear to all parties that specific contexts are considered relevant and cognizable in the pretrial
stages of litigation. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). For critiques,
see, e.g., Katrina Roen, Transgender Theory and Embodiment: The Risk of Racial Maginaliation, in THE
TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER 656, 656-66 (Susan Stryker & Stephen Whittle, eds., 2006)
("Despite the claims of inclusiveness of both transgender and queer writings, . . . perspectives of
whiteness continue to resonate, largely unacknowledged, through transgender and queer
theorizing[.]").
161 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998); Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 265 (1989) (plurality opinion) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
162 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79. Also that Term, the Court held that that Title II of the ADA
proscribed discrimination by prison benefits program as a covered "public entity," reasoning that
the "fact that a statute can be 'applied in situations not expressly anticipated [or specifically
referenced in-text] by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth."' Pa.
Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473
U.S. 479, 499 (1985)).
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stigmatic harm which comes from being evaluated by a process that treats one as
inferior by reason of one's race or sex.163
Title VII's plain language allows a prima facie case to be made as to myriad
forms of workplace discrimination. Under current interpretations, plaintiffs gener-
ally proceed under two theories. In an individual discrimination claim (i.e., disparate
treatment), plaintiffs must prove actual motive.164 In a disparate impact claim, plain-
tiffs must show that a facially neutral employment policy or practice, such as a per-
sonnel test, caused "discriminat[ion] in operation" without being required to prove
discriminatory motive.165 The following review of the core provisions makes clear
what traditional classification analysis obscured-Title VII's protections can reach
everyone, if need be.
1. Section 703(a)
Causation's central role in defining illegal Title VII discrimination is located in
the statute's first substantive provision, § 703(a):166
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrim-
inate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.167
The text and structure do not specify any particular mode of proving causation.
Within the statutory scheme only one subset of discrimination claims, § 703(a)(2),
is remotely akin to classification, an employer's adverse act of classifying, segregat-
ing, and delimiting employees arbitrarily according to a protected trait as harmful
in se.16 8 Cases alleging overt line-drawing of classes, such as group-based segregation
163 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring). And even earlier, and more
clearly, its goal was to "prohibit all practices in whatever form which create inequality in
employment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin
" Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) (citations omitted).
164 Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003) (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)). This Article focuses on individual disparate
treatment claims because these claims are most commonly litigated by sexual minorities.
165 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971).
166 42 U.S.C. § 2000e_2(a) (2012) ("unlawful employment practices").
167 Id. (emphasis added).
168 42 U.S.C. § 2000e_2(a)(2) (2012). By 1971, the Court read subsection (2) to support a
disparate impact claim that looks at trait-based classification and segregation without proof of
intent, distinguishing such claims from the individual disparate treatment claims that are our focus
here. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-32. As Sandra Sperino has demonstrated, however, courts "largely
treat[] this provision as related to disparate impact claims [and] have not fully explored how it
would apply to disparate treatment claims" even as the Court acknowledged disparate reatment
causes arising from subsection (2) in Texas Department of Housing & Communi) Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities Projec, Inc. SANDRA F. SPERINO ET AL., THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
108 (West, 1st ed. 2019); Sandra F. Sperino, Justice Kennedy's Big New Idea, 96 B.U. L. REv. 1789,
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or policies, are salient and hard-to-ignore instances of discrimination. But the clas-
sification modality is a provision disjunctively separate (via an "or") from
703(a)(1)'s "because of ... sex" prohibition.
More importantly, § 703(a) does not exclusively limit itself to any method of
proof. Congress's bipartisan Interpretive Memorandum from the 1964 Title VII
deliberations expressly declined to define "discrimination," much less in connection
with the five protected "characteristics," in the sense of traits:
It has been suggested that the concept of discrimination is vague. In fact it is clear
and simple and has no hidden meanings. To discriminate is to make a distinction, to
make a difference in treatment or favor, and those distinctions or differences in treat-
ment or favor which are prohibited ... are those which are based on any five of
the forbidden criteria: race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.1
69
The Court, continuing through the Roberts era, has carefully followed that lead in
referring to five social traits and characteristics, rather than classes.170 As it further
clarified, § 703(a) claims are more correctly described as "determinative-factor"
claims-rather than "single-motive" claims.171 In Bostock, the Court acknowledged
its prior holding in Burrage v. United States that Title VII but-for causation under
703(a) can involve more than one determinative factor.172
Workplace harm "because of' the protected traits require plaintiffs to point to
facts supporting a causal connection between the trait and the employer's decision.
In 1989, however, the Price Waterhouse Court fractured over the outer limits of cau-
sation. A majority of the Justices rejected a holding that a plaintiff need establish
"but-for" causation in a Title VII disparate treatment claim.173 Price Waterhouse's
equally monumental contribution is its deliberate deviation from the anti-
1808-14 (2016) (citing Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2519 (2015)) (discussing
how Title VII claims under § 2000(a)(2) are severely undertheorized and may not be limited to
classification).
169 Interpretative Memorandum of Title VII of H.R. 7152, 110 Cong. Rec. 7213. The Court
has repeatedly relied on the "authoritativeness" of the Interpretive Memorandum, "written by the
two bipartisan 'captains' of Title VII." Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 n.8 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (citing Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 581 n.14 (1984)).
170 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 347 (2013) (characterizing race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin as "characteristics" and "personal traits" rather than as
"classes"); see also Trait, WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2424 (3d ed. 1961)
(defining trait to include "a characteristic of behavior or a typical artifact that distinguishes a
human culture-called also culture trait") (emphasis added).
171 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241, 241 n.7 (plurality opinion) (stating that "we know that
the words 'because of' do not mean 'solely because of,"' and noting "Congress specifically rejected
an amendment that would have placed the word 'solely' in front of the words 'because of.")
(citation omitted).
172 Bostock v. Clayton Cty., No. 17-1618, slip op. at 5-6 (590 U.S. __ (2020)) (citing Burage
v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 888-89 (2014)).
173 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240-41 (plurality opinion); id. at 262 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); see also SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA'S COURTS
UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW 102, 200 n.46 (2017) (noting Justice O'Connor opined that
in the two-step process, the plaintiff should not be required to carry the entire causation burden).
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classificationist approaches to causation exemplified in Gilbert.174 Specifically, the
Price Waterhouse plurality explained, "We take ['because of] to mean that gender must
be irrelevant to employment decisions,"175 while Justices Kennedy and Scalia in-
sisted "because of' necessarily required more onerous proof of but-for causation.176
Price Waterhouse went too far, however, in resolving the evidentiary standard in de-
fendant-employers' favor once a protected trait was shown to have played a role
amid non-discriminatory reasons for the harm, prompting a Congressional override
in the form of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
2. Section 703(m)
Through the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("1991 CRA"), Congress restored some
of the breadth and complexity that courts had read out of Title VII.1 77 Throughout
the 1980s, the Supreme Court fashioned onerous burdens of proof for workers over
eight precedents interpreting the statute with the ffect of favoring employers.178
Section 703(m) states, in relevant part: "an unlawful employment practice is estab-
lished when the complaining party demonstrates that [a protected trait] was a moti-
vating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated
the practice."179 It thus clarified that the original statute's causation also includes a
less onerous causation standard where a trait was a "motivating factor" among oth-
erwise permitted factors, responding to the Price Waterhouse dissenters' argument for
exclusively strict "but-for" causation.180
But Congress went even further to rebuke the courts institutionally. The 1991
CRA also allowed juries, rather than judges alone, to decide factual questions-
including causation-in disparate treatment cases because bench trials too often
174 See supra note 18 (defining the anti-classification approach drawn from formal equality
principles).
175 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240 (plurality opinion) (using "sex" and "gender"
interchangeably).
176 Id. at 284 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
177 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
178 These cases included Price Waterhouse, discussed supra, and Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 651-56 (1989). Eskridge provides historic context from the high court,
where grouping of all "equality" cases persists in the conflation of equality principles with racial
politics:
[T]he Supreme Court of the 1980s was almost never willing to interpret statutes to effectuate
the rights of African Americans and other racial minorities to be free of workplace discrim-
ination .... The Court's abandonment of the Carolene canon protecting racial minorities took
on the appearance of outright hostility in [1989, which] triggered the most dramatic civil
rights override since the Reconstruction Amendments overrode Dred Scott, [and] reinter-
preted Title VII and related job discrimination statutes in ways that made it more difficult
for African Americans to challenge workplace discrimination.
William T. Eskridge, Quasi- Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45
VAND. L. REv. 593, 613 (1992) (focusing on the experiences of African American civil rights
plaintiffs).
179 42 U.S.C. § 2000e_2(m) (2012).
180 SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 173, at 98 ("[T]o prove a discrimination claim, the
employee must show causation-that is, the harm or injury must be connected to the worker's
race, sex, or other protected trait.").
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rendered sparing outcomes for employers.181 Elevating "motivating factor" causa-
tion to statutory form further insulated Title VII's jurisprudence from classification-
only arguments after 1991. In other words, the employer's motive with respect o
the protected trait is causation's touchstone.8 2 In light of this history, the role of
Title VII's causation component of analysis is remarkably clear. The 1991 override
recognized that causation includes harmful reliance upon an employee's pluralistic
sex trait, as Price Waterhouse did to Ms. Hopkins.
B. Hegemonic Evidentiary Tests and the Doctrinal Correction
Title VII's evidentiary procedures today reflect the Burger Court's attempts to
unify anti-discrimination jurisprudence under constitutional and Title VII interpre-
tation. These devices reflect and reinscribe "dominant concepts of discrimination,"
as Kimberl6 Crenshaw's work in intersectionality theory prominently demon-
strated.8 3 For decades, a wide array of experts have critiqued rules born of the
1970s such as McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting.184 The evidentiary rules enervate
anti-discrimination law in the following common ways: conflating evidentiary pro-
cedure with defining discrimination; requiring plaintiffs membership in a "pro-
tected class" as part of the prima facie case; and burying evidence of harm "literally"
motivated by sex.185 Courts struggle to reconcile the anti-subordination approach
of the post-1991 statute with old evidentiary rules of protected-class, direct, or cir-
cumstantial evidence which, if adapted or set aside, might be deemed legal error on
181 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(1) (providing any party in Title VII action the right to demand jury
trial if compensatory or punitive damages are sought); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90,
102 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting reasonable factfinders may conclude that an
employer's "discriminatory motivation 'caused' the employment decision"); see, e.g., Instructions
to the Jury at 10, Tudor v. Se. Okla. State Univ., No. CIV-15-324-C (D. Okla. Nov. 20, 2017),
ECF No. 257 (in jury instruction number 6: "[F]or Plaintiff to prevail, you must find any wrongful
action occurred because of her gender or because of a perception that that person does not
conform to a typical gender stereotype.").
182 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 343 (2013) (holding that a plaintiff
alleging retaliation after the 1991 Civil Rights Act had to meet "but-for" causation standard, unlike
the "lessened" standard for a discrimination claim under § 703(a)).
183 See discussion supra Part IB; Crenshaw pioneered intersectionality theory in the law in
Crenshaw, supra note 84, at 140, 144-45. See also Reva B. Siegel, Equalip Divided, 127 HARv. L.
REv. 1, 17-23 (2013) (noting that as to weathervane constitutional cases within antidiscrimination
law, "[t]he aim of the Burger Court's discriminatory purpose decisions was to limit dramatically
the power of federal courts to intervene in democratic decisionmaking ... [and] repeatedly
explained that it was for representative government ... to guide the nation beyond the legacies of
segregation").
184 See infra notes 186-96 and accompanying text. Seegeneraly SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note
173, at 115-23; Katie Eyer, The Return of the Technical McDonnell Douglas Paradigm, 94 WASH. L.
REv. 967 (2019); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH.
L. REv. 2229, 2232 (1995).
185 E.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) ("discrimination against
transsexuals because they are transsexuals is literally discrimination because of sex." (quoting
Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 212 (D.D.C. 2006))); Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Conn.,
172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 525 (D. Conn. 2016) (same).
2020] 763
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
appeal. In this sense, the denial of Title VII protection to sexual minorities reflects
that courts were not only conservative,186 but are also confused or constrained.
1. "Protected Class" Evidence
Formulaic rules for detecting workplace discrimination began with the McDon-
nell Douglas test the Court created in 1973-a year before Gedul. The Court in-
tended the test to be plaintiff- friendly, a device for those who did not have strong
evidence of biased motive to establish an inference of discrimination.187
Although it was meant to be a provisional framework, most courts strictly im-
pose its four-part prima facie case: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) qualifi-
cation for the job; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4) a causal connection
between the adverse action and protected classification.'88 To survive summary
judgment, an employee must ultimately be able to show that any allegedly lawful
justification provided by the employer was pretextual.189 Deborah Malamud aptly
called its creation "quasi-legislative."190 The post-2015 doctrinal correction under-
scores how, decades later, lower courts incorrectly interpreted McDonnel/Douglas to
impose a policy-like supposition that Congress intended Title VII to be an anti-
classification statute, rather than address all manifestations of social "traits" most
commonly used to disempower or devalue.191
Aware of its potential for misapplication, the Court cautioned that "the prima
facie proof required ... is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual
situations."192 In Burdine, it reiterated that McDonnell Douglas was suitable for the
"most common" cases,193 but not when direct evidence exists at the outset or later
comes to light.194 But courts often do not heed that advice. Plaintiffs whose
186 Jessica A. Clarke, How the First Fory Years of Circuit Precedent Got Title VII's Sex
Discrmination Provision Wrong, 98 TEX. L. REv. ONLINE 83, 88-89 (2019) ("While some opinions
made empty professions of abhorrence for all forms of discrimination, close examination of their
reasoning, language, and sources demonstrate that appellate judges were blinded by the biases and
misunderstandings of their era.").
187 The Supreme Court first articulated the employee's burden of proof in disparate
treatment cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), and refined it
in significant ways in Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-508 (1993); and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-48 (2000) [hereinafter all three cases collectively "McDonnellDouglas test"].
188 See Green, 411 U.S. at 802. Other courts' articulations of this prima facie case may vary
widely. Seegeneraly SANDRA F. SPERINO, MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: THE MOST IMPORTANT CASE IN
DISCRIMINATION LAW (2018) (discussing the impact of the three-part burden shifting framework).
189 See generaly Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002).
190 Malamud, supra note 184, at 2264.
191 See supra Part IIA. As Sperino has noted, the Supreme Court has not tended to view the
McDonnell Douglas Test narrowly and identified other frameworks, such as "cat's paw" proximate
causation. See Staub v. Proctor, 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011).
192 Green, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13 (unanimous decision) (emphasis added); accord U.S. Postal
Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 n.6.
193 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54.
194 E.g., EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d 560, 569 (6th Cir. 2018)
(noting defendant owner and operator during discovery testified that his motive for firing plaintiff
Aimee Stephens, a transgender woman, was "because 'he [sic] was no longer going to represent
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identities or life experiences are not familiar to judges face skepticism and paradox-
ical results.195 The test prompted a sizeable wave of criticism that McDonnell Douglas
has significantly impeded Title VII's reach in actually identifying discrimination.196
The unworkability of a protected class "element" was clear in Fabian, where
the court implicitly modified the test at summary judgment.197 Deborah Fabian, an
orthopedic surgeon, successfully interviewed for an opening with the Hospital of
Central Connecticut, having already been told the job was hers, and signed a con-
tract that included a start date. After she informed the Hospital that she is a
transgender woman, and would present in her affirmed gender of female at work
using her name Deborah, the Hospital denied her the position. Only circumstantial
evidence existed for the Hospital's decision, as it did not disclose to Ms. Fabian that
it did so because she revealed her transgender status. Interestingly, Fabian recited
the protected class membership prong, but its summary judgment analysis never
returned to it. Instead, Fabian discussed at length that disqualifying transgender
plaintiffs from sex discrimination as a "class" simply because of their transgender
status would raise Equal Protection problems. The court then reasoned that a literal
reading of "because of sex" (reviving Ulane 1) meant Ms. Fabian raised sufficient
evidence of sex-based discrimination. Fabian's adaptation recognized that a non-
categorical analysis of the protected trait-hostility toward a change in sex-is sex-
based discrimination, no differently than it would be for a change in religion.198
himself as a man [and] wanted to dress as a woman."'); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
905 n.11 (11th Cir. 1982) ("[T]he case of sexual harassment that creates an offensive environment
does not present a factual question of intentional discrimination which is at all elusive.").
195 Crenshaw, supra note 84, at 140, 144-45 (illustrating how "dominant conceptions of
discrimination condition us to think about subordination as disadvantage occurring along a single
categorical axis" and the centrality of white women's experiences in "the doctrinal
conceptualization of sex discrimination").
196 E.g., SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 173, at 123; Malamud, supra note 184, at 2232. The
McDonnellDouglas- Burdine-Hicks-Reeves videntiary framework, which the Supreme Court fashioned
over a series of opinions between 1973 and 2000, helped clear a wide swath in federal dockets,
especially the claims of workers whose identities are excluded from dominant worldviews.
Employment discrimination litigation had comprised the highest percentage of federal civil
dockets but plummeted by 
4 0% between 1979 and 2006; during that time, plaintiffs prevailed in
only 15% of cases, compared with 51% of all other civil cases. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J.
Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARv. L. & POL'Y
REv. 103, 103-04, 127 (2009).
197 The facts of this case are drawn from the district court opinion, Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent.
Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 513 (D. Conn. 2016).
198 Id. at 527. In a prominent post-trial appeal, the Sixth Circuit reevaluated McDonnellDouglas
on another basis in Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2005). There, Philecia
Barnes, a transgender female police officer, advanced a sex-stereotyping argument and defendant
argued, inter alia, that she could not show membership in a protected class. The panel upheld
Barnes's favorable jury verdict, reasoning that her successful prima facie claim included proof that
"he [sic] was a member of a protected class by . . . his failure to conform to sex stereotypes" as
recognized in Price Waterhouse and Smith. Id. (citing Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir.
2004)).
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By replacing the protected class prong with a protected trait analysis, as this
Article proposes, trial of a Title VII case would focus instead on causation, a ques-
tion of fact reserved for juries.199
2. "Direct" Evidence
The distinction between binary and pluralistic definitions of sex also reveals an
evidentiary wrinkle in Title VII's distinction between direct and circumstantial evi-
dence. Direct evidence of discrimination is evidence that directly ties prejudices to
the defendant's harmful act such that bias was motivated by a protected trait.200
Direct evidence is highly persuasive under Title VII, as proof that the defendant
acted directly because of the bias establishes the prima facie case and, if proven,
resolves the ultimate question of discrimination.20 1
Without a new mode for analyzing traits, doctrinal problems persist in deciding
what is direct versus circumstantial evidence of sex discrimination for sexual minor-
ities. Transgender, lesbian, and gay plaintiffs who have presented direct evidence
that they were mistreated because of their status routinely face judges who down-
grade the evidence as circumstantial. That, in turn, triggers the McDonnell Douglas
test. In Kastl v. Maricopa County Communiy College, a transgender female instructor,
Rebecca Kastl, challenged her employer's decision to bar her and another
transgender colleague from using the women's room.202 The College required both
to use the men's room unless they provided proof of "genital correction surgery."203
Ms. Kastl argued that her use of the men's restroom was inappropriate and also
potentially dangerous to her.204 Even with direct evidence that the College decided
to segregate her from the women's restroom based upon her sex, the trial and ap-
pellate courts simply applied the McDonnell Douglas test, but in different ways.205
The district court accepted the defendant's argument that "biological
wom[e]n" were a "protected class," but held that because Ms. Kastl had not yet had
anatomical surgery she could not establish her membership for the prima facie
case.206 The appellate court instead held that Ms. Kastl did have direct evidence (in
the form of sex-stereotyping conduct by the college), but unnecessarily applied
199 E.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (evidence that
a defendant's explanation for an employment practice is "unworthy of credence" is "one form of
circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination.").
200 Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1320-
21 (11th Cir. 2011).
201 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002). All an employer would be left to
assert is a factual and not a legal question: that it would have taken the same action absent the
illegal motive.
202 Kastl v. Maricopa Cty. Comm. Coll. Dist., 325 Fed. App'x 492, 493 (9th Cir. 2009)
(summary order).
203 Kastl v. Maricopa Cty. Comm. Coll. Dist., No. Civ.02-1531PHX-SRB, 2004 WL
2008954, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004).
204 Kast, 325 Fed. App'x at 493 n.1.
205 Kastl v. Maricopa Cty. Comm. Coll. Dist., No. CV-02-1531-PHX-SRB, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 60267, at *15-20 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2006); Kast, 325 Fed. App'x at 493-94.
206 Kast, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60267, at *18-19 (striking plaintiffs evidence as untimely
filed and accepting defendant's expert testimony that the only sex criteria were plaintiff genitalia,
hormonal production capacity, and chromosomes, which all indicated male "biological" sex).
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McDonnel/Douglas to accept the employer's argument hat it had a legitimate business
need to bar Ms. Kastl from the women's room for "safety reasons."207 It did not
question the safety rationale as legitimate despite the absence of evidence, but pro-
ceeded to contradict its statement of direct evidence earlier in the opinion by con-
cluding Ms. Kastl could not show that sex ("gender") was a motive.20 An unwill-
ingness to deviate from McDonnell Douglas where direct evidence exists shows that
the test can be applied to disappear, rather than detect, motive.209 As discussed ear-
lier, appellate and lower courts have recently sought to avoid this result for sexual
minorities.
The Court should discard the direct/circumstantial divide from Title VII en-
tirely, since motive remains the employee's burden of proof. After 1991, the moti-
vating-factor theory of causation forced the Court to clarify that direct and circum-
stantial evidence are equally sufficient to state a mixed-motive claim.2 1 0 In Costa v.
Desert Palace, Justice Thomas observed that courts are too skeptical of Title VII case
evidence and held that both forms of evidence are adequate for mixed-motive
claims under § 703(m).21' The same rule should be applied to but-for claims under
§ 703(a). The direct/circumstantial divide is yet another reason for eliminating the
McDonnell Douglas test.
3. Bostock's "But-For" Conflation After Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.
As discussed above, Oncale failed to provide adequate guidance for analyzing
the sex trait prior to undertaking a causation analysis. A plurality of the Second
Circuit en banc in Zarda conflated the two elements, calling it "but-for causation."22
207 Kast, 325 Fed. App'x at 493-94. The 2009 unanimous panel included Justice Gorsuch,
sitting then by designation on the Ninth Circuit.
208 Id. at 494. By contrast, the court in Haris Funeral Homes agreed that direct evidence
existed when the defendant owner testified that his motive for firing plaintiff Aimee Stephens, a
transgender woman, was "because 'he [sic] was no longer going to represent himself as a man
[and] wanted to dress as a woman."' EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d 560,
569-71 (6th Cir. 2018) ("[While this Court does not often see cases where there is direct evidence
to support a claim of employment discrimination, it appears to exist here." (quoting EEOC v.
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837, 850 (E.D. Mich. 2016))).
209 See MAYERI, supra note 82, at 714 ("complex discrimination" claimants "fac[e] both
structural and ideological barriers to recognition and redress"); Paulette M. Caldwell, The Content
of Our Characteriations, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 53, 92 (1999) (positing that the end of group-based
subordination requires "turn[ing] away from distinctions without difference, to confront
difference itself and the material conditions it engenders" outside of hierarchy).
210 Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99-100 (2003). On eliminating the
direct/circumstantial divide, see generally William R. Corbett, AnAllegog of the Cave and the Desert
Palace, 41 Hous. L. REv. 1549, 1557 (2005); Charles A. Sullivan, Looking Past the Desert Palace
Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 911, 934 (2005); Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law:
Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMoRY L.J. 1887, 1913 (2004).
211 "The adequacy of circumstantial evidence also extends beyond civil cases; we have never
questioned the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in support of a criminal conviction, even
though proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required." Id. at 100 (citing Holland V. United States, 348
U.S. 121, 140 (1954)).
212 Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 116-19 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (presenting
comparative test as whether "but-for" employee's sex, gay employee's treatment would have been
different); Bostock v. Clayton Cty., No. 17-1618, slip op. at 2, 5, 10 (590 U.S. __ (2020)).
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According to Zarda, if the comparative tool Hively proposed-swapping in a gay
man for a heterosexual woman as the employee attracted to men-was determina-
tive to the outcome, then "but-for" causation was met. Zarda imputes this framing
to Hively, but the Seventh Circuit made no such linguistic escalation in Hively.213
Under the Zarda plurality's method, there is no separation between element (a)-
the process for identifying if a characteristic like sexual orientation is linked to sex
as a protected trait-and element (b), causation. Recall, however, that causation is
the independent jury question as to whether the sex trait or characteristic actually
motivated the firing, harassment, assault, or other harm.
Hively and Harris Funeral Homes took slightly more caution in limiting the com-
parative method as a tool for understanding how social construction of the employ-
ees' sex characteristic is linked to the protected sex trait (element (a) above). Re-
spectively, the decisions located sexual orientation and transgender status within the
sex trait. In Harris Funeral Homes, the court joined Hively in observing that when
"isolat[ing] the significance of the plaintiff's sex to the employer's decision," "it is
analytically impossible to fire an employee based upon that employee's status" as a
transgender person or lesbian employee "without being motivated, at least in part,
by the employee's sex."214 While this language from both Circuits mentions sex-
linked status in connection with motive, the panels carefully avoided framing its
approach as "but-for" causation. Framing it as simply one comparative tool avoided
the danger of embedding a double causation analysis in these cases.
Some employee advocates within the Bostoc trio adopted Zarda's but-for cau-
sation argument before the Court, while also reserving sex stereotyping, statutory
interpretation, and other arguments in their briefing.2 1 5 Notably, at the Zarda and
Bostock consolidated argument, employees' counsel summarized their causation the-
ory as follows:
My test says that you have treated the people differently because of sex, which is
what we are asking you to hold here. When you treat a gay man who wants to
date a woman differently than a woman who wants to date a woman, that - that's
discrimination. Then you get to what I've said, which is you have to ask whether
213 Id. at 116 (citing Hively v. Ivy Tech Comm. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 345 (7th Cir.
2017) (en banc)).
214 EEOC v. RG. & G.R Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d 560, 575 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing
Hively, 853 F.3d at 345).
215 Employee's counsel in Harris Funeral Homes this Term cited the "but-for" framing from
an ambiguous passage in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015),
in which the Court uncharacteristically failed to distinguish the Title VII "but-for" retaliation
standard from Nassar from the more lenient standard for an underlying disparate treatment claim.
Brief for Respondent at 21-22, RG. & G.R Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC, 884 F.3d 560 (6th
Cir. 2018) (No. 18-107). Conversely, the employee's briefs had raised a host of broader alternative
arguments, including plain meaning interpretation, statutory history, sex discrimination causation
precedent, statutory text and structure, sex-stereotyping, sex plus discrimination, and textualism.
Brief for Petitioner at 12-31, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 723 Fed. App'x 964 (11th Cir. 2018) (No.
17-1618); Brief for Respondent at 19, 23, 26, Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, 883 F.3d 100 (2d
Cir. 2018) (No. 17-1623); Brief for Respondent at 28-45, RG. & G.R Harris Funeral Homes v.
EEOC, 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018) (No. 18-107).
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a reasonable person under these circumstances would be injured by the imposi-
tion of the particular sex-specific world.2 16
This strategy further embraced the approach of the older anti-classification
cases at the expense of addressing the two elements of trait and causation separately,
as counsel in the trio used "sex," biological sex, and binary birth sex as interchange-
able concepts at argument.217 Thus, by this time the employee advocates decided to
deemphasize the social construction analyses from lower federal courts in the post
2015 wave, which had shifted the doctrine away from liberal formalism.
Another drawback in proffering "but-for" as the standard for LGBT workers
is that its identification is with § 703(a) determinative-factor theories, when mixed-
motive (§ 703(m)) theories typically can be raised by plaintiffs or defendants in the
alternative in every case. Once a "but-for" theory becomes a per se rule for status-
based Title VII coverage of a sexual minority, the Bostock Court understood that
without revising but-for causation, it wouldn't leave room for analysis of cases
where legitimate motives such as poor job performance are raised by the employer,
which in fact happened in Zarda and Bostock. Plaintiff's counsel originally argued as
much in Bostock: "[E]ven if sexual orientation was a 'legitimate consideration' for an
employment decision (which it is not), an employment decision on that basis would
still be "'because of' sex and the other, legitimate consideration[,]'. .. because sexual
orientation is dependent upon the sex of the employee."218 In other words, the Bos-
tock defendant's motive or bias is not severable in the decisionmaker's mind between
anti-gay bias as a "legitimate" motive, and anti-male ("sex") bias as the illegitimate
motive. As a matter of statutory interpretation, a causation analysis using binary sex
comparators should not be used to preclude social construction evidence in light of
Price Waterhouse and all of the law's provisions.
III. MULTIAXIAL ANALYSIS
Multiaxial analysis is a contextual approach to defining the role of a protected
trait under Title VII and other civil rights statutes. As discussed above, formalistic
evidentiary rules hide the fact that the Supreme Court has limited substantive theo-
ries of discrimination. Under a contextually variable approach, multiaxial analysis
theorizes animus as traceable to subordination that can account for relational, struc-
tural, or institutional dynamics.219 By uncoupling causation from the sex trait anal-
ysis, the statute will realize the true scope of sex beyond a fixed binary and "any
216 Transcript of Oral Argument at 15:12-23, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019)
(No. 17-1618) & Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 17-1623); see also id
at 48:6 (Solicitor General referring to "Plaintiffs simple but-for test").
217 Id at 7:18-24 (employees' counsel); id. at 44:10-23 (employers' counsel); id. at 60:21-
61:9 (U.S. Solicitor General); Transcript of Oral Argument at 4-5, R.G. & G.R Harris Funeral
Homes v. EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 18-107) (employee's counsel); id. at 30 (defendant's
counsel); id at 47 (U.S. Solicitor General).
218 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 215, at 50.
219 Echoing earlier calls heeded among recent courts, Title VII is "capable of contextually
variable answers." Abrams, supra note 26, at 2533; see also Peter Kwan, Symposium: Cosnthesis and
Praxis, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 673, 687 (2000) (positing that "identity categories multiply within any
set of circumstances").
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individual" whose sex-related traits are targeted for serious workplace harms. Mul-
tiaxial analysis normatively expands analysis in these cases beyond trait essentialism
and the most common patterns of discrimination, such as essentializing of women
as effeminate for sex discrimination theories220 or other ascribed stigmas so that
they are not "legally enshrin[ed]" by attempts to define discrimination.22
Part III.A details the framework and how it guides jurists and juries in evaluat-
ing whether, for example, mistreatment is because of sex even when all parties dis-
agree as to what plaintiffs "sex" characteristic is. In Part IIIB, we turn to examples
of multiaxial analysis in application, and discuss its capacity to adjudicate cases
where plaintiffs assert intersecting forms of discrimination such as racialized sexism.
Part III.C discusses how multiaxial analysis addresses earlier critiques from intersec-
tionality theorists.222 Part III.D then responds to anticipated counterarguments re-
garding judicial legislating and the operability of multiaxial analysis.
A. The Axes
Under a multiaxial approach, each axis represents a distinct viewpoint regard-
ing the protected trait, generating both evidentiary and narrative frameworks for
any disagreement regarding a Plaintiff's trait.223 This approach is akin to the familiar
investigation and presentation of evidence to a factfinder in a civil case by the par-
ties.22 4 The distinct axes that could be triggered during adjudication with respect to
the sex trait are as follows: (1) the Plaintiffs conception of their22 own sex; (2) the
Defendant Employer's conception of Plaintiffs sex; and to the extent relevant to
the Defendant's conceptions, (3) broader Society's and (4) the State's definition of
220 See Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Genderfrom Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate
Man in the Law and FeministJurispdence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 76 (1995).
221 Yuracko, supra note 30, at 215 (citing Richard T. Ford, Race as Culture? Why Not?, 47
UCLA L. REv. 1803, 1805 (2000)); see also cunningham, The "Racing" Cause ofAction, supra note 32,
at 712 ("I wish to distinguish who we are and might be from what is and has been ... done to
us.").
222 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
223 Reflecting on (then) nearly two decades of adjudicating employment law cases, Second
Circuit Judge Denny Chin noted the high dismissal rates at summary judgment, attributable in
part to diffuse evidentiary tests and in part to narrative:
I appreciate that McDonnell Douglas was crafted to help plaintiffs in situations where there
was a lack of direct evidence of discrimination. But given how employment law has evolved,
I do not think it is helpful to anyone anymore.... Lawyers must help the judge care, for a
judge who cares is more likely to get it right. A lawyer helps the judge care by telling a com-
pelling story, using some passion, but relying primarily on logic. Judges do not always get it
right, but judges at least the vast majority of judges try to get it right.
Hon. Denny Chin, Summary Judgment in Employment Discrimination Cases: A Judge's Perspective, 57
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 671, 681 (2013).
224 The conceptual model is that of three-dimensional ball-and-socket joint with axes that
can pivot, rather than traditional x- and y- axes along each ray, or projected identification of the
Plaintiff. Cf Vade, supra note 28, at 261 (proposing gender "locations" within a three-dimensional
"gender galaxy" to replace prevailing linear, spectrum-like conceptualization of gender between
male and female).
225 The singular usage of "their" is intentional.
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Plaintiff's sex (see Figure 1). If established, the court must adjudicate the claim as
to the trait(s) and proceed to questions of fact as to causation.
As a situational model, multiaxial analysis describes axes that converge at the
node of the legal question (here, a conception of a protected trait such as sex), but
may shift relative to each other depending on the workplace or point in time because
discrimination arises relationally.226 This conceptualization realizes the "fair read-
ing" of the sex trait and its "denotations" originally raised in Ulane I, and adds a core
principle from the post-2015 doctrinal correction: the subjectivity of Employers and
the State as social institutions. Addressing whether gender identity is comprehended
by the word "sex," Ulane I framed the breadth of the trait's definition as "a question
of one's own self- perception [and] also a social matter."227 Indeed, that portion of
Ulane I addressed causation as an entirely separate element. Interactively, the axes
may generate evidence sufficient to answer whether the protected trait was tied to
the characteristic, as reflected in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Multiaxial Analysis Reflecting Situational Separability of Viewpoint Axes
SelfPlamntiff Cl Defradant Empioyer
E., Sex Trait
I frefernwopamtfhf e eazed concepz on ;f a1 d iensiin of thtsr tdeiies that became &abent because of Mhe
,y .a, and other tnepotant c-nceps mite
The chief axis is the Plaintiff's determination as to their own trait or traits or,
in the intersectional context, multiple traits. Our dignitary interest in self-identifica-
tion is consistent with Title VII's text and purpose, as imposing a conflicting defi-
nition on an employee, absent remediation, would expose us to inferior term and
conditions of employment.228 D. Wendy Greene has observed that "perceptions or
misperceptions that [are] observable or ascertainable characteristics signify an
226 Kwan earlier proposed his cosynthesis model as a "complex and unique matrix of
identities that shift[s] over time, is never fixed, [and] is constantly unstable" without forcing, as
intersectionality theory does, a decision "a priori which identities matter." Kwan, supra note 219,
at 687 (quoting Peter Kwan, Jefre Dahmer and the Cosynthesis of Categories, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1257,
1277 (1997)). In this way, the identity categories are 'mutually defining, synergistic, and complicit"
in capturing multiple subordinations. Id. at 688.
227 Ulane I, 581 F. Supp. 821, 823 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
228 29 U.S.C. § 703(a)(1).
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individual's physical and mental capability, morality, and self-worth, among other
individual characteristics," making the harm of discrimination ascriptive or descrip-
tive.229 As our nation's history reflects, a primary tool of dehumanization is through
sex,230 in tandem with race, color, religion, and national origin. Accordingly, where
more than one trait is also prominent in the discriminatory harm, each of the axes
is intersectional as to dynamics toward the (non-compartmentalized) Plaintiff.231
The minimum additional axis needed to articulate a claim is a Defendant Em-
ployer's axis representing its view of the Plaintiff. If significantly misaligned with
the Plaintiffs axis, the separation evinces a dissonant view of the Plaintiffs trait.
The subordination may manifest as a gravitational "pull" from the Defendant's axis
to shift the Plaintiffs self- attestation of their trait. Or, dissonance between the axes
may represent stigma that was a factor in the employer's adverse decision, even
absent a prescriptive stereotype. A Defendant Employer's animosity toward both
actual or perceived "biological sex" attributes, sexual orientation, gender presenta-
tion, gender identity, or other sex-linked traits can be evidence that it impermissibly
relied on Plaintiffs sex. As Kramer previously argued, these traits encompass both
status and conduct, aligning with sex discrimination doctrine.232
The other potential axes are Society and the State (government). Their rele-
vance depends on particular circumstances that place them at issue in the case. The
Society axis may reflect dictionary definitions, occupational culture, geographically
specific practices, or political and historical context, with experts or amici as possi-
ble aids.233 The axis would also encompass traditionally relevant witness viewpoints
such as non-Defendant co-workers, customers, or those whose involvement in the
matter as members of society may provide evidence of the Defendant's state of
mind regarding the trait.
229 See Greene, supra note 21, at 115; see also Paulette M. Caldwell, Intersectional Bias and the
Courts: The Story of Rogers v. American Airlines, in RACE LAW STORIES 571, 572-73 (Rachel F. Moran
& Devon W. Carbado eds., 2008) (discussing requirement of immutability under Title VII as blind
to the "dignitary and psychological interests in ... racial and ethnic identity," and the "message
of hostility, intimidation, and inferiority communicated by workplace rules that target ...
culturally specific behaviors").
230 See, e.g., Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 588 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded
for reconsideration in light of Oncale, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998) (sex-based harassment "is often motivated
by issues of power and control on the part of the harasser, issues not necessarily related to sexual
preference.") (quoting Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 355 (D. Nev.
1996)); see also id. at 587 n.22 ("The notion that harassment is only actionable sexual harassment
when it can be attributed to the harasser's sexual interest in the victim is reminiscent of the now
discredited idea that rape is a sexual act, rather than an act of violence. . . . It is, in fact, quite
common for a man (whatever his sexual orientation) to be raped by another man, and the rapist
is frequently heterosexual.").
231 See Part III.C infra (addressing intersectional analysis).
232 Kramer, supra note 29, at 940-41 (devising framework to capture sex as both a status and
a practice).
233 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 255 (1989) (plurality opinion) (relying upon
use of social psychologist's testimony regarding sex stereotyping in plaintiff's partnership selection
process); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 823 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (relying upon competing
medical expert testimony regarding how sex is medically determined); Schroer v. Billington, 577
F. Supp. 2d 293, 306 (D.D.C. 2008) (same); and infra notes 286-97; see also Ann C. McGinley,
Masculinities at Work, 8 OR. L. REv. 359 (2004) (addressing occupational culture).
[Vol. 24:3772
DEHUMANIZATION "BECAUSE OF SEX"
The State's position may be relevant with respect to defining and administrat-
ing the trait or the trait-linked characteristic at issue. As an institution of the State,
a court must focus on its actual task of determining the scope of the forbidden
criterion and avoiding prior courts' errors in adopting their own conception of a
Plaintiff's sex. Title VII's other statutory traits-race,234 color, religion,235 and na-
tional origin236-are socially and often privately defined.237 Indeed, the State's po-
litical branches engage in variable and oppositional politics regarding sex. Currently,
the Trump Administration's policies seek to rescind gender identity and sexual ori-
entation from federal non-discrimination protections,238 while states and localities
expand their laws and policies expressly memorializing such protections, defining
sex and gender broadly, and offering non-binary or third sex markers, and other
policies.239 As to sexual orientation, however, laws that excluded homosexuality
"put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or
234 Indeed, this societal realization came decades sooner for race than for sex as a social
construct. See Greene, supra note 21, at 145-47, 146 n.284 (describing the ignominious race
determination trials of the nineteenth century grounded on "physical features" and "racial
reputation" to grant or withhold political, social, legal, and economic rights); Shaare Tefila
Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617-18 (1987) (in § 1982 action for right to hold property,
holding that members of Jewish congregation were not foreclosed from claim of racial
discrimination because they were distinct people that Congress intended to protect, regardless of
fact society considers them "part of the Caucasian race" today); St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji,
481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (in § 1981 action for race-based discrimination, holding Congress
intended to protect those identifiably "subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of
their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.").
235 See Sue Landsittel, Strange Bedfellows? Sex, Relgion, and Transgender Identity Under Title VII,
104 Nw. U. L. REV. 1147, 1172 (2010).
236 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2019) (defining national origin discrimination "broadly as including,
but not limited to, the denial of equal employment opportunity because of an individual's, or his
or her ancestor's, place of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic
characteristics of a national origin group.").
237 The original conflation of Equal Protection with workplace anti-discrimination law raises
the public/private division that Mary Dunlap and Dean Spade prominently advanced.
Fundamental to their critiques is that the State directly purveyed harm to sexual minorities and is
inherently suspect in administering matters arising from sex with life-and-death consequences
through binary sex designation, sexual orientation, and failing to recognize gender identity. See
Dunlap, supra note 66, at 1131-39 (discussing implications of the "two-sex presumption" in the
law and among courts and civil rights advocates); Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS
L.J. 731, 738 (2008) (discussing the assumption of gender cohesiveness and stability as mythical
and based upon inconsistent criteria). This separability of the State axis for the purposes of Title
VII adjudication is distinct from the debate over whether the State should ever track natal sex or
sex, as those who rely upon updated identification of their sex to navigate institutions daily would
seek an incremental approach. See Anna James (AJ) Neuman Wipfler, Identi Crsis: The Limitations
of Expanding Government Recognition of Gender Identity and the Possibility of Genderless Identiy Documents,
39 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 491, 496-97, 534-39 (2016).
238 Shirley Lin, LGBTQIA+ Discrimination, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND
LITIGATION §§ 27:4, :7.50, :7.75, :8, :17 (Merrick T. Rossein ed., 2019).
239 See Resources: Non-Binary Gender. Intersex., supra note 156; Identity Document Laws and Policies:
Driver's License, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, www.lgbtmap.org/img/maps/citations-id-
drivers-license.pdf (last visited May 13, 2020) (reflecting that 36 states permit residents to update
sex marker on driver's license without requiring proof of a medical procedure, and 11 states permit
update to sex marker upon proof of a medical procedure).
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stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied."240 Like the Defendant Em-
ployer axis, the Society and State axes are conceptually separable from the Plaintiffs
self- definition of their trait.
A fairly common State intervention in the workplace arises in employees' dis-
closures of government documents to their employer in order to verify identity or
work authorization. Sex markers on governmental identification is a structural form
of notice and commonly triggers intolerance against sexual minorities. Those who
identify as non-binary or as a different sex than that assigned at birth often face
challenges when attempting to amend the identity documents necessary to navigate
sex-segregated spaces. Examples include schools, workplaces, and government-
sanctioned modes of transportation.241 Transitioning sexes and other sex-linked
conduct have motivated employers to deny designating new, accurate names, re-
quested pronouns, and other public markers of sex, which may precipitate work-
place harassment or assault242 and create barriers in accessing health insurance for
gender minorities.243
The multiaxial approach recognizes the forces between the axes that function
like ascriptive and prescriptive forms of discrimination. Sex is not limited to a finite
set of categories such that, for example, intersex, non-binary, gender-fluid, or
agender individuals may accurately self identify with respect to their sex. Unlike sex
stereotyping, the multiaxial approach clarifies from a compliance perspective that
the employees' self- identification of sex must be respected. A Plaintiff may provide
evidence of the Defendant's disagreement with their sex trait, irrespective of
whether the State recognizes it. Conversely, government agencies that do recognize
a third non-binary sex, for example, could provide additional support for plaintiffs'
240 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).
241 See, e.g., 20/5 U.S. Trnsgender Surrey, supra note 57, at 56 (reporting that only 11% of
transgender respondents reported that all of their identification cards and records bore their
preferred name and gender); Zzyym v. Pompeo, No. 15-cv-02362-RBJ, 2019 WL 764577, at *1-
2 (D. Colo. Feb. 21, 2019) (denying motion to stay order enjoining U.S. State Department from
relying upon binary-only gender marker policy to deny non binary intersex plaintiff Dana Zzyym
passport with sex marker of "X").
242 In the largest survey examining the experiences of transgender people in the United
States, 77% of respondents who had a job in the past year hid their gender identity at work, quit
their job, or took other actions to avoid discrimination. 20/5 U.S. Transgender Suvey, supra note 57,
at 148. In 2014 alone, as many as 15% of respondents reported that they were verbally harassed,
physically attacked, and/or sexually assaulted at work because of their gender identity or
expression; and nearly one-quarter (23%) reported other forms of mistreatment based on the
same during the past year, including (1) being forced to use a restroom that did not match their
gender identity, (2) being told to present in the wrong gender in order to keep their job, or (3)
having a supervisor or coworker share private information about their transgender status without
their permission. Id. at 148, 153-54.
243 See, e.g., Third Amended Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 2, 10-11, Newman-
Scheel v. Fedcap Rehab. Servs., Inc., No. 1:17-cv-08220 JPO-OTW (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2018),
Doc. 57 (alleging conduct as grounds for Title VII sex discrimination against plaintiff who
identifies as trans-masculine genderqueer); Complaint in Intervention of Plaintiff/Intervenor Dr.
Rachel Tudor at 12, United States v. Se. Okla. Univ., No. 5:15-cv-00324-C (W.D. Okla. May 5,
2015), Doc. 24 (describing employer's health insurance for professors explicitly excluded
medically necessary treatments and health care benefits for transgender individuals connected
with sex- and gender-affirming treatment).
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identification of their sex. But it is not a prerequisite that the State agree with the
employee's sincerely held identity for purposes of employer compliance.
B. Multiaxial Analysis in Application
Multiaxial analysis still requires Plaintiffs to prove that the trait motivated the
mistreatment. They must also show that they were qualified for the position (except
in cases of harassment).244 Further, Plaintiffs must still show that the employer's
conduct was sufficiently serious to alter the terms and conditions of their employ-
ment. For the Defendant's part, the defenses of business necessity or other valid,
otherwise non-discriminatory reasons remain unchanged as fact issues for the jury.
Courts have yet to adopt aspects of this approach to trait-causation beyond
iterative categorical approaches, such as sex-stereotyping, comparator, and associa-
tional discrimination theories, to "isolate the significance of the plaintiff's sex to the
employer's decision."245 Employers will find that the multiaxial model reflects best
practices for training and prevention, reducing litigation costs. Centering employee
dignity and self- identification promotes preemptive compliance over discrimination
remediation. Employers that are multijurisdictional or based in states or localities
with laws that extend beyond the fixed-sex binary will find that they implicitly com-
ply with multiaxial analysis.246
Finally, dissonance among the axes (viewpoints) can be supported by circum-
stantial or direct evidence of discriminatory motive, after which the court must pro-
ceed to questions of fact regarding whether the employee can prove factual causa-
tion and the requisite severity of harm.247
1. Bostock v. Clayton County
The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Bostock illustrates how courts fare without
multiaxial analysis, and how the analysis would differ under the multiaxial
method.248 Gerald Lynn Bostock worked as a Child Welfare Services Coordinator
for Clayton County, Georgia.249 During his decade-long tenure, he received good
performance evaluations and the program he managed received a county program
244 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
245 Hively v. Ivy Tech Comm. Coll. Of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 345 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
246 According to one study, 54% of the adult "LGBT" population resides in states that
prohibit workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity through either
descriptive group coverage or interpreting existing sex discrimination laws to include sexual
orientation and gender identity. Nondiscnimination Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT,
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/nondiscrimination-laws (last visited April 11, 2020).
247 This proposal eliminates the unnecessary bifurcation between but-for motive and mixed-
motive cases that recently stumped the Court in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-99
(2003).
248 The facts are drawn from the district court's opinion, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., No. 1:16-
CV-1460-ODE, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217815, at *1-5 (N.D. Ga. July 21, 2017). Although the
Supreme Court's Bostock decision looking to "traits or actions" as to sexual orientation issued just
before this Article's publication, this Section's application of multiaxial analysis provides a social
construction approach to the protected trait of sex. Bostock v. Clayton Cty., No. 17-1618, slip op.
at 2, 10 (590 U.S. __ (2020)).
249 Bostock, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217815 at *2.
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excellence award.250 In January 2013, Mr. Bostock joined a gay recreational softball
league, the Hotlanta Softball League, and publicized Clayton County's CASA (the
program for which he received the awards) to fellow league members as a volunteer
opportunity.2
In the ensuing months, Mr. Bostock's participation in the league and his sexual
orientation were openly criticized by at least one individual with significant influence
on his employer's decision-making.2 5 2 Also, in May 2013, during a meeting with the
Friends of Clayton County CASA Advisory Board (at which Mr. Bostock's super-
visor was present), at least one individual made disparaging comments about his
sexual orientation and participation in the league.253 The following month, the
County terminated Mr. Bostock's employment, citing an audit into the CASA pro-
gram funds that began in April 2013 and allegedly found "conduct unbecoming one
of its employees."254 Mr. Bostock disputes the audit and its findings as pretext for
a discriminatory firing.2 55
a. The Prior Approach
Even under the post-1991 statute, the Eleventh Circuit continued to invoke a
"classification-first" approach to evidence in sexual orientation cases that misreads
the statute. The Eleventh Circuit Bostock panel rejected a per se approach that would
treat animus against a gay man's sexual orientation as sex discrimination because of
decades-old precedent hat "discharge for homosexuality" is not prohibited by Title
VII. 256 It instead offered a truncated sex-stereotyping approach, noting that Mr.
Bostock could have alleged "gender nonconformity" as cognizable sex discrimina-
tion, depending on what other characteristics he could have pled.257 But once the
employee has pled that he is gay (or homosexual), evidence of any animosity moti-
vated by his gay status is imputed completely to an "unprotected" gay class.
Although it did not state so outright, the Eleventh Circuit's holding implies
that in claims like Mr. Bostock's, evidence of anti-gay discrimination (such as ho-
mophobic remarks commonly associated with bullying) can never be used as evi-
dence of sex discrimination if the plaintiff has revealed that he is gay. Rather than
analyzing group identity and conduct coextensively, the court left the door open for




253 Id at *2-3.
254 Id at *3.
255 Id
256 Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs., No. 17-13801, 723 Fed. App'x 964, 964 (11th
Cir. 2018) (mem.); Bostock, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217815, at *7 (citing Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979)). Vr. Bostock, however, decided not to appeal the district court's
dismissal of his gender-stereotyping claim before the Evans decision issued, though the Eleventh
Circuit noted it was a viable theory. Bostock, 723 Fed. App'x at 965, 965 n.2.
257 Bostock, 723 Fed. App'x at 965, 965 n.2 (citing Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317
(11th Cir. 2011)). The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the bifurcated approach the year prior, in
Evans v. Ga. Regional Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1254-55 (11th Cir. 2017).
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man and its import that he is a man who is attracted to other men.258 This approach
raises, unanswered, the question of what sex-stereotyping claim remains if a court
cannot refer to or rely upon the fact of his orientation as a man attracted to other
men.
b. Multiaxial Analysis
Under multiaxial analysis, sexual orientation cannot be a class-based bar to so-
cial and definitional context, but recognizes that sexual variation includes social la-
bels based on Mr. Bostock's protected sex trait. The axes serve to clarify the relevant
views of his sex-linked trait-sexual orientation-as the dissonance that will then
be tested as the motive for his firing. Under the first axis, Mr. Bostock is a man who
sincerely believed that he could identify as a gay man without repercussion at his
work (dignified self- identification). His additional association within the community
with gay sports league members (Society axis-association with others who were
presumably similar to Mr. Bostock in self- identification) became grist for criticism
of his sexual orientation at work (Defendant Employer axis). The Defendant Em-
ployer's view is based upon its harsh treatment of Mr. Bostock only after his sexual
orientation became known to its employees, namely his supervisor and coworkers,
although it had no bearing on Mr. Bostock's competence at work. His workplace
nonetheless became the forum for criticism regarding his disclosed status as gay and
his participation in the gay sports league (dissonance). Although the people who
disparaged his sexuality to his employer are not defendants but referred to his un-
related gay softball affiliation in the community, that evidence may represent the
Society axis through non-defendant witnesses and evidence of the County's percep-
tion of his sexual orientation.
Isolating sexual orientation as a sex-linked trait is possible under Hively's insight
that Plaintiff's sex trait cannot be ignored when considering his sexual orientation.
In Mr. Bostock's particular case, sexual orientation became salient when his homo-
sexuality became known, and a man's attraction to women would not have led to
his dismissal. Dismissed prior to discovery, Mr. Bostock's pleading provided fair
notice that the litigation might uncover evidence that the sex-based trait of sexual
orientation was the motive for the decision to dismiss him.259 Although Mr. Bostock
had no evidence pre-discovery directly connecting his firing to anti-gay animus, the
258 The Eleventh Circuit cited its Evans decision from the prior year, which also ducked the
issue. Bostock, 723 Fed. App'x at 964 (citing Evans, 850 F.3d at 1256). Sonia Katyal has previously
observed a presumption of polarized, mutual exclusivity in sex such that it can "never rest between
the two or challenge the poles altogether." Sonia K. Katyal, The Numems Clausus of Sex, 84 U. CHI.
L. REv. 389, 430 (2017). The blinkers effect of classification analysis over social context was also
apparent in a court's refusal to consider socially ascribed traits in a ban on all-braided hairstyles
within the framework of "interacting" sex and race discrimination. Caldwell, supra note 229, at
570 (discussing decision dismissing Title VII challenge to no-braided-hairstyles policy based upon
race-blind analysis of sex discrimination and sex-blind analysis of race discrimination).
259 As discussed above, the axes address adequacy of pleading that the employer considered
his sex-linked trait, rather than sufficiency of proof of causal connection to his termination. See
Evans, 850 F.3d at 1269 n.14 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting) (noting he is not
proposing mention of lesbian status in pleading is sufficient proof for a successful case: "Of
course, a plaintiff who alleges that her employer discriminated against her because she failed to
conform to the employer's view that women should be sexually attracted only to men must prove
that, in fact, that was a motivating factor" for the adverse action).
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first McDonnellDouglas prong should be modified to examine sexual orientation as a
relational trait inextricable from Mr. Bostock's male sex, just as Fabian did with re-
spect to transgender status. In other words, using Hively's analysis of sex of compar-
ators as a means to isolate the link to sex, not to establish "but-for causation."
Only after isolating the trait, the causation connecting his sex-linked trait (sexual
orientation) to the adverse employer decision (firing Mr. Bostock) is what is subject
to but-for-motive or mixed-motive analysis, not the isolation of the protected trait
that multiaxial analysis provides.260 A Title VII court's obligation is to ensure that
sex and gender were "irrelevant to employment decisions."261 Next, as to causation,
it must find that the protected trait could have "actually motivated the employer's
decision" (i.e., "had a determinative influence on the outcome").262 Despite the
Zarda plurality's elision of trait with causation, the en banc decision articulated a
standard jury instruction that would treat trait and causation separately:
[A] plaintiff has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff because of sex,
meaning that the plaintiff's sex was a motivating factor in the defendant's decision
to take the alleged adverse employment action against the plaintiff. In a case al-
leging sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII, an instruction should add
that "because of sex" includes actions taken because of sexual orientation.263
The State axis features prominently in Mr. Bostock's case, as the Defendant
Employer is a local government entity. That he and the agency administered Geor-
gia's family law, including the vital areas of adoption and foster home placement,264
could yield evidence related to the State's continuing dejure exclusion of homosex-
uality. After Obergefelllegalized same-sex marriage, Georgia advocacy groups caution
that some marriage license clerks may not comply with federal law without couples
260 See supra Part II.B.3 and note 215 (Zarda and employee counsel's argument that trait and
causation analyses are combined under "but for causation").
261 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012)
(prohibiting use of traits as a "motivating factor" in adverse employment decisions).
262 See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 346 (2013) (quoting Hazen Paper
Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)); see also Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 888-89
(2014).
263 Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 116 n.11 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (citing
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-2(m)). The post-1991 motivating factor (i.e., "mixed motive")
theory is an alternative theory available in a § 2000e-2(a) traditional pretext claim. If Mr. Bostock
was deemed after discovery into the suspiciously timed audit still blameworthy in his expenses,
sex-based iscrimination in the form of anti-gay animus would not entitle him to job reinstatement
or compensatory damages such as back pay or emotional distress, but the animus as a motivating
factor would yield the Pyrrhic victory of declaratory relief and attorneys' fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g) (2012). The same would apply to Daniel Zarda, whose employer, a skydiving company,
terminated him because a female customer claimed that he inappropriately made contact with her
during a tandem dive and disclosed that he was gay, although he informed her he was gay "and
ha[d] an ex-husband to prove it" to put her at ease before they were strapped together. Zarda, 883
F.3d at 108-09. It would be inappropriate for a modern court to interpret § 2000e-2(m) to deem
the "biological" sex as an illegal motivating factor apart from the so-called legal "anti-gay" motive
under the reasoning in Hivey and Zarda that they are inextricable concepts.
264 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 215, at 5 ("[Mr. Bostock] is a dedicated social services
professional who has for many years been committed to ensuring that abused and neglected
children have safe homes in which to live, grow, and thrive.").
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first having to litigate and obtain a federal court order.265 For example, the state's
rejection of same-sex family structures as invalid undermined their adoption of fos-
ter children between 2011 and 2015, at the time Mr. Bostock revealed his sexual
orientation and was fired.266 Under multiaxial analysis, Mr. Bostock would be enti-
tled to decisionmakers' communications opining on such policies in discovery. Fig-
ure 2 reflects the dissonance between Mr. Bostock's and Defendant Clayton
County's axes with respect to his sex, and the relative alignment of the State and
Society axes as presented.
Figure 2: Multiaxial Analysis, Sexual Orientation-Based Dissonance in Bostock v.
Clayton County
_y yrScit
Sex Trait ( Jle biological sex necessatily considered in same-sex attraction)
2. Wood v. C. G. Studios
In one of the few reported workplace claims addressing intersexuality, Wood v.
C.G. Studios, multiaxial analysis addresses the sex-based harms that an employee may
face when revealing an identity outside of fixed binary sex.267 C.G. Studios denied
Wilma Wood a promotion and terminated her employment after discovering that
265 See GA. CONST. art. I, § IV, para. I (prohibiting marriages between persons of same sex
or recognition of same-sex marriages solemnized in other jurisdictions); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-
3.1 (2019) (same); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-30(b)(1) (2019) (regarding provision of marriage
licenses); e.g., Marriage Equalp in Georgia, Frequenty Asked Questions, LAMBDA LEGAL,
https://s 11863.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/FAQ-Marriage-Equality-in-Georgia.pdf
(last visited Apr. 21, 2020).
266 GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2019) ("the courts of this state shall have no jurisdiction
whatsoever under any circumstances ... to consider or rule on any of the parties' respective rights
arising as a result of or in connection with such marriage"), superseded by implication by Obergefell
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); e.g., Inniss v. Aderhold, 80 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1340, 1360 (N.D.
Ga. 2015) (pre-Obegefell opinion denying motion to dismiss same-sex couples' challenge to
Georgia's prohibitions on same-sex marriage, noting lesbian couple's claim that as of 2011 they
"cannot jointly adopt their [foster] children because Georgia does not recognize their marriage").
267 Wood v. C.G. Studios, 660 F. Supp. 176 (ED. Pa. 1987). In the only other workplace
anti-discrimination decision involving a known intersex plaintiff, brought under analogous state
law, a court recently held that plaintiff sufficiently articulated a "gender"-based hostile work
environment claim. Hughes v. Home Depot, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 2d 223, 224, 227, 228 (D.N.J.
2011).
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she underwent gender-corrective surgery for a so-called "hermaphroditic condi-
tion." 268 The multiaxial approach has the capacity to account for an externally as-
cribed identity. Because Ms. Wood now self identifies as a binary female, the mul-
tiaxial approach allows her to prevail against mere labels to detect socially contested
sex characteristics-here, prior intersex status-as a stigma.
a. The Prior Approaches
The court rejected Wilma Wood's claims by relying on Ulane II and its progeny,
limiting the "plain meaning" of sex to encompass only discrimination against
women qua women and men qua men.269 Nor would she be recognized under the
classification-first approach in Bostock, as the court identified her group-based ani-
mus as "individuals [who] have undergone gender-corrective surgery,"270 and re-
lated it to "transsexual" status.271 The comparative binary approach recently ad-
vanced in Zarda and Hivey is also inapt, because in its unique context it detects the
social role of sex in animosity against same-sex sexual orientation.272 As identified
in Part I, discrimination based upon the sex assigned to someone at birth must con-
template actual sexual variation through intersex or non-binary status as a subset of
"sex."
b. MultiaxialAnalysis
As discussed above, multiaxial analysis acknowledges that there is no single
paradigm for discrimination nor essentialist experience of harassment faced by sex-
ual minorities across all employers. Nor are certain trait-based dynamics constant
over time, across work settings, or throughout one's life.
Ms. Wood's dignitary interest remained in being recognized as a woman, hav-
ing obtained surgery to affirm her sex and gender identity as female (the Plaintiff
axis). The studio was hostile toward Ms. Wood because of her former intersex status
and subsequent change in sex, rather than her current binary-presenting identity (the
Defendant Employer axis), generating dissonance between the two axes in the form
of stigma. Her change in sex from intersex to female (literally, a trans-sexual change)
should have been treated as direct evidence of the studio's unlawful consideration
of Ms. Wood's sex (both former and current) in its decisions. Summary judgment
should have been granted to Ms. Wood rather than denied.273 Further, the court, as
the State, joined the Defendant Employer in viewing her as having a
268 Wood, 660 F. Supp. at 176. Employment claims by intersex plaintiffs are less common in
that they may be less visible: members may publicly express their gender aligned with a sex binary
and thereby avoid gender policing or other harassment based on their sex characteristics. See Janet
Dolgin, Discrninating Gender: Legal, Medica, and Social Presumptions About Transgender and Intersex
People, 47 Sw. L. REv. 61, 96-97 (2017).
269 Wood, 660 F. Supp. at 177-78 (interpreting state statute with "because of ... sex"
provision identical to Title VII).
270 Id. at 177.
271 Id. at 178.
272 Nor would the associational discrimination method, akin to Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967), apply to this situation where intimate associations are not in the case.
273 Multiaxial analysis would, however, eliminate any special proof structures resulting from
direct or circumstantial evidence, as in all other types of civil claims. Application of the McDonnell
Douglas Test to a mixed-motive theory under § 703(m) would produce incoherent results.
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"hermaphroditic condition" and being trans-sexual, rather than dignifying Ms.
Wood's self- identification. The relative positions of the axes in Ms. Wood's case are
illustrated in Figure 3:
Figure 3: Multiaxial Analysis, Trans-Sexual Dissonance in Wood v. C. G. Studios
SdatF nf,1a bi<5 Iid t ipker& beSte aor
stigma
EmpJo' Dis.tonance attributing stigma to Pfninniff asf frev
Insen ex wish trans-sexuwl identity (Intersex wo Female)
Sewte DLssonance in courd labeling Plaintiff as "Hermaphrodite" or
cassiying her as trans-sexuwl
Sex Trail (female binary identity as dignitary)
Under this approach, animosity against an intersex individual with the inverse
chronology of events would also be cognizable. If C.G. Studios had thought its
employee was a binary female with respect to sex and gender identity, but fired its
employee for planning to adopt an original intersex sex and non-binary gender iden-
tity, that firing too would be sex-based discrimination.
In this sense, Loving v. Virginia's substantive-equality holding is even more pow-
erfully illustrated under multiaxial analysis. Its invalidation of anti-miscegenation
laws as violating equality recognized that trait-based "purity" is in line with the mul-
tiaxial analysis's ability to detect subordination. A defendant's ideological beliefs re-
garding sex as a fixed, binary category, expressed in Wood through economic harm
toward intersex individuals, is a sex-supremacist view that violates Title VII. By
contrast, looser classificationist theories such as sex stereotyping may well describe
the harm in some cases, but not all.
C. Intersectionality and Multiaxial Analysis
By paying attention to the unique context of the particular parties and evidence
in each case, the multiaxial framework fundamentally expands our evidentiary and
narrative abilities to articulate how intersectional discrimination operates. The sui
generis approach of multiaxial analysis avoids what critical race theorists Devon Car-
bado and Cheryl Harris identified as intersectionality critiques simply generating
new forms of essentialism.274
Intersectionality research has demonstrated that employees discriminated
against based upon a confluence of traits, for example, racialized sexual hostility,
have an exceedingly low chance of success in the courts due to the
274 Carbado & Harris, supra note 34, at 2200 (disaggregating intersectionality and anti-
essentialism).
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compartmentalized evidentiary rules that drive substantive fact-finding.275 Some
judges spurn overlapping or mutually-defined theories of harm "governed only by
the mathematical principles of permutation and commutation, clearly rais[ing] the
prospect of opening the hackneyed Pandora's box"276 or creating a "many-headed
Hydra ... splinter[ing Title VII] beyond use and recognition."277 Such declarations
reveal that these courts are beholden to an imagined duty to apply the old rules to
all forms of discrimination, particularly to forms less familiar to them.278 A situa-
tionally variable approach, on the other hand, addresses the important critique that,
for example, there is no singular Black women's experience within a static hierarchy,
and that subordination and privilege can both be present but illuminated by partic-
ular contexts.2 79
Current trends shift to advising plaintiffs with a sex claim to assert it under
either sex alone or a sex-plus analysis.280 However, those doctrines fail to capture
the full competence of the statute or our courts and presuppose too much about
the facts of every Title VII case. Indeed, the judiciary's application of intersection-
ality theory reached a high-water mark in the 1980s, after the Tenth Circuit held in
Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co. that a Title VII plaintiff who experienced hostility as a Black
woman could aggregate evidence of anti-Black racial animus generally with evidence
of sexual hostility generally in support of her sex-based hostile work environment
claim.281 A situationally variable approach understands that one's identity as a Black
woman does not predetermine the forms of discrimination she may face.282
275 Empirical research in intersectionality scholarship further substantiates the problems in
how courts apply anti-discrimination laws. See, e.g., Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages:
An Empirical Test of Intersectionalip Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 991, 1009, 1011
(2011) (reporting sampling in which plaintiffs with multiple claims were only half as likely to win
their cases as other plaintiffs); Minna J. Kotkin, Diversi and Discrinaton: A Look at Complex Bias,
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439, 1459 (2009) (reporting sampling in which employers prevailed at
summary judgment, in whole or in part, in multiple-claims cases at a rate of 96%, as compared to
73% in employment discrimination claims in general).
276 Degraffenreid v. Gen. Motors Assembly Div., St. Louis, 413 F. Supp. 142, 145 (E.D. Mo.
1976).
277 Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C. 1986). Rarely, if at all, do criminal
opinions applying general- or specific-intent statutes bemoan the potential kaleidoscopic variation
inhering in human thought.
278 This Article acknowledges that intersectionality inheres in everyone across contexts, and
that sexual minorities include racial minorities, and vice versa. Where necessary to the analysis,
this Article denotes distinct groups but recognizes they comprise some of the same individuals.
279 Hutchinson, supra note 34, at 312-13; see also Deborah K. King, Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple
Consciousness: The Context ofa Black Feminist Ideology, 14 SIGNS 42, 51-52 (1988).
280 E.g., Elengold, supra note 25, at 479-80 (urging expansion of the "sex-plus" doctrine as
overlapping "circles" of identity such as race and sex, and individuals with similar intersecting
identities as individual points and collective clusters). Empirical research in intersectionality
scholarship further substantiates the flaws in compartmentalized theories of discrimination. See
Wood v. C.G. Studios, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
281 Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing Jefferies v. Harris
Co. Cmty. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980)).
282 Crenshaw called this critique the "single categorical axis." Crenshaw, supra note 84, at 140.
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In this way, a Black transgender man could raise without exclusion any gender
hostility he faced that was inextricably related to his race or color.283 Title VII does
not require a one-size-fits-all approach to cases with interlocking claims. This is not
to say that aggregate comparators are never a proper mode of proving disparate
treatment; they may be sufficient in some cases, but not necessary. In one example,
a Kentucky court recently held under the compartmentalized comparisons that a
Black transgender man, Mykel Mickens, adequately alleged race- and gender-based
harassment and firing based upon General Electric's denying him use of a bathroom
close to his workstation, addressing harassment argeted at a white woman but not
harassment argeted at him, and harshly reprimanding him for conduct for which
other employees were not reprimanded.284 By contrast, sex-based harassment may
well have been more salient than racism against he plaintiff in Jeffries, but to turn a
blind eye to social context and exclude those workplace dynamics as irrelevant was
legal error.2 85
Unfortunately, because few opinions address simultaneous dimensions of
identity, litigants and their counsel in turn theorize Title VII cases in compartments
and to limit characterization of the evidence at the pleading stage, as appears to have
happened to Mr. Mickens's terse complaint framed around comparators rather than
the interaction of his race and transgender status. Ruthann Robson and Rosenblum
have raised concerns that "but-for" comparative arguments set up a one-off stand-
ard for queer communities in achieving perfect citizenship, thus failing to reach all
individuals when queer-based status is centered at the exclusion of intersectional
identities of class, sex, race, sexual practice, and gender performance.286
Consider the following atomized approach at summary judgment in a case al-
leging only color-based discrimination, but where sex also could have been concur-
rently pled. In Brack v. Shoney's, Inc., a Tennessee district court concluded that Jerry
Brack, a gay African American employee who is dark-skinned, would be unable to
prove discrimination based upon color with respect to his demotion and termina-
tion.287 Mr. Brack was a restaurant supervisor whose boss, Victoria Chevalier, re-
ferred to him as "the little black sheep" or "the black sheep" on several occasions.288
She stated that a promotion to a store with a higher sales volume required someone
"fair-skinned." 289 His boss made these remarks around the time that she denied Mr.
283 See, e.g., Richard Juang, Transgendering the Politics of Recognition, in THE TRANSGENDER
STUDIES READER 706, 711 (Susan Stryker and Stephen Whittle, eds., 2006) (observing that skin
color, age, and class, inter alia, also shape views of the presence of a transgender woman i  the
women's restroom as a "threat," where transgender individual is instead at risk).
284 See Mickens v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 3:16CV-00603 JHM, 2016 WL 7015665, at *3 (W.D.
Ky. Nov. 29, 2016).
285 Jefres, 615 F.2d at 1035-36.
286 Darren Rosenblum, Queer Intersectionality and the Failure of Lesbian and Gay "Tictories", 4
LAw & SEXUALITY 83, 85-86, 93-96 (1994), https://ssrn.com/abstract=897584 (citing Ruthann
Robson, Address at the Conference of the National Lesbian and Gay Lawyers Association (Oct.
24, 1992)).
287 Brack v. Shoney's, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 938, 950 (W.D. Tenn. 2003).
288 Id at 943, 948.
289 Id at 948.
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Brack the position and demoted him to a lower-volume store.290 Ms. Chevalier, who
is also Black, referred to Mr. Brack as "unusual" (which a witness took to refer to
his sexual orientation) and as "Princess Diana," which Mr. Brack (or his counsel)
interpreted to refer only to his sexual orientation.291
Although Mr. Brack was held accountable for cash shortages at closing on
three occasions, the court considered the "fair-skinned" comment as direct evidence
of colorism only as to one act.292 The court believed that he could, however, prove
such discrimination only with respect to hostile work environment and retalia-
tion.293 It did not consider whether a jury could interpret Ms. Chevalier's view of
Mr. Brack as compromised as to all employment decisions.294 The parties and court
should have explored whether the "Princess Diana" comment could mock his skin
tone along with his sexual orientation. Similarly, multiaxial analysis would have re-
quired the court to consider whether Ms. Chevalier pejoratively viewed Mr. Brack
as "unusual" for a Black man because he is gay, as she demoted a lighter-skinned
peer for the same cash-handling violations and replaced Mr. Brack with a darker-
skinned employee.
In the context of race, the Court has been willing to discipline lower courts
when they fail to meaningfully evaluate the influence of other dimensions of bias,
even if they are not based on an additional statutory ground.295 In 2003, the Court
considered a case in which a Tyson poultry plant failed to promote two Black peti-
tioners, Anthony Ash and John Hithon, to shift manager positions by promoting
two white males instead.296 After Mr. Ash and Mr. Hithon prevailed at trial, the
district and appellate courts believed that a new trial was warranted, disregarding
evidence that the plant manager referred to each of the petitioners as "boy" multiple
times. A unanimous Court disagreed with the panel's holding that the "boy" com-
ments required "modifi[cation] by a racial classification like 'black' or 'white"' before
they could evidence a connection to race.297 Rather, the Ash Court held that the
"speaker's meaning may depend on various factors including context, inflection,
tone of voice, local custom, and historical usage."298 Certainly, socio-historical usage
of the word "boy" to humiliate and subordinate adult Black male peers illustrates
how courts can go awry with evidentiary rules at the expense of Title VII's remedial
goals.
290 Id at 944.
291 Id at 943.
292 Id at 948.
293 Id at 952-55.
294 See, e.g., Sogg v. Am. Airlines, 193 A.D.2d 153, 161 (N.Y. 1993) (upholding jury verdict
finding gender, age, and disability discrimination and holding record could support inference that
earlier discriminatory animus from failure-to-promote claim also permeated discriminatory
termination of employment).
295 cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics I, supra note 32, at 499 ("Few courts have been
willing to do the calculus for the intersection of more than two forms of oppression.").
296 All facts are derived from Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 455 (2006) (per
curiam).
297 Id at 456.
298 Id
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D. Responses to Anticipated Counterarguments
This Part addresses the charge of judicial legislating driving the Bostock, Zarda,
and Hive# dissents. Furthermore, this Part addresses the critique that courts cannot
possibly handle detailed inquiry into the social construction of traits.
Absent dispositive legislative history on the sex provision, the judiciary has
imposed its own theories of democracy to legitimize statutory interpretation.299
Courts unnecessarily assert that original and public meanings in debates cannot exist
outside of "formal governmental institutions."300 This underpins the decidedly un-
empirical view that failure to pass legislation adding sexual orientation and gender
identity as protected traits proves legitimate democratic disfavor.30 I Yet courts ex-
clude sexual minorities whether or not they view the words "because of sex" to be
unambiguous. The new-textualism approach yielded the admission in Oncale that
Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment but could
not anticipate the particulars, leaving courts to "give effect to the broad language
that Congress used."30 2 Statutory analysis "must begin . . . with the language of the
statute itself" and if the statute's language is plain, "the sole function of the courts
is to enforce it according to its terms."'
303
Interpreting Title VII to reach socially contested traits is a task delegable to
trial courts. A multiaxial, socially contextual approach cannot be deemed simply a
project of representation reinforcement shaped by the politics of exclusion.30 4 Judi-
cial responses hostile to open contextual, non-formulaic inquiry in civil rights cases
reflect the fact that some jurists do not wish to take on the anti-discrimination work
that Congress delegated to them.305
Multiaxial analysis may also encounter resistance from both conservatives and
civil rights advocates. One reason is that it does not provide a one-size-fits-all rule.
Rather, it requires context to operate. A court once complained that it should not
be tasked with "grading competing doctoral theses in anthropology or sociol-
ogy." 306 Setting aside the divide-and-conquer approach of the old rules, however, is
necessary to achieve the socially informed, circumstantial approach in Ash. In
299 Schacter, supra note 36, at 595.
300 Id. at 663 (emphasis omitted).
301 Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 242 (2011) ("Post-enactment legislative history
(a contradiction in terms) is not a legitimate tool of statutory interpretation.").
302 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (citing Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)); Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 115
(2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 276 (1982); Los Angeles
Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)).
303 Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 119 (2006) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)).
304 See also Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
305 I intentionally draw a parallel here between some courts' disfavor of Title VII claims and
their reluctance to implement the racial desegregation of public schooling. See DERRICK A. BELL,
SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR
RACIAL REFORM 112 (2004) (noting "judicial reluctance to push court ordered desegregation"
causing schools to remain racially unintegrated by the 1980s).
306 EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1034 (11th Cir. 2016).
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addition, litigation strategies with respect to social identities from time to time may
become tailored to satisfy conservative courts rather than reflect multiplicity and
fluidity.30 7 Multiaxial analysis realizes Harris's earlier principle, that the law should
not eschew categories altogether but explicitly treat them as "tentative, relational,
and unstable."308 It provides a concrete method of approaching social variables that
does not succumb to postmodern impracticability. Rather, all legal actors must do
their part to develop the doctrine, starting with counsel who draft more expansive
pleadings, use multiaxial narrative in briefs, employ experts, and obtain more de-
tailed discovery.
Whether specialized knowledge is required to adjudicate the claims depends on
the nature of the case. Experts in occupational psychology can explain the connec-
tions to the workplace and are subject to the usual testing.30 9 Some Justices noted
that they may not have deemed such testimony necessary in the first place as to Ms.
Hopkins's partner evaluations from Price Waterhouse that employed stereotypes.310
But courts do not regret the assistance of experts in areas unfamiliar to most judges
and juries, and should not. Where formalist judges could not understand the links
between sex discrimination and pregnancy, marital status, and domestic violence,
lawmakers and officials instantiated the meaning through amendment or agency
guidance. 311 Expert testimony and amici have always been helpful in explaining
how, for instance, traits such as sexual orientation and transgender status are inher-
ently sex-dependent and how they may arise in work settings.
In the landmark case Doe ex rel. Doe v. Boyertown Area School Distrct, the trial
court and Third Circuit relied upon experts in a gender identity and privacy case
brought to exclude transgender children from public school restrooms.312
307 Rosenblum, Queer Legal Victories, supra note 44, at 50.
308 Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 586
(1990).
309 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,235-37, 255-56 (utilizing social psychologist
and professor to determine disparate treatment based upon sex); Jensvold v. Shalala, 829 F. Supp.
131, 138 (D. Md. 1993) (same, with respect to behavioral science and psychology experts in case
against federal government employer National Institute of Mental Health).
310 "It takes no ... expertise in psychology to know that, if an employee's flawed
'interpersonal skills' can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is
the employee's sex and not her interpersonal skills that has drawn the criticism." Price Waterhouse,
490 U.S. at 256.
311 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(a) (2019) (defining restrictions based upon pregnancy, childbirth,
and related medical conditions as sex discrimination pursuant to Title VII) and supra notes 102-
03; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.4(a) (2019) (defining marriage-based restrictions in employment as sex
discrimination pursuant to Title VII); U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, Questions and
Answers: The Application of Title VII and the ADA to Applicants or Employees Who Experience Domestic
or Dating Violence, Sexual Assault, or Stalking (Oct. 12, 2012), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
publications/qa-domesticviolence.cfm; see also Julie Goldscheid, Gender Violence and Work:
Reckoning with the Boundaries of Sex Discrimination Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 61, 69 (2008)
(arguing that while "[d]omestic and sexual violence may appear to be 'gender neutral,' in that these
acts may be committed by and against both women and men," in practice "they are inextricably
connected to gender discrimination in a general, rather than an individual sense, by virtue of their
disproportionate impact on women as victims, [and] the surrounding social and historical
context").
312 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 522-24 (3d Cir. 2018).
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Addressing Title IX law doctrinally analogous to Title VII, the testimony provided
vital background on the medical necessity of consistent reatment in one's affirmed
gender. It also relied on the American Academy of Pediatrics' amicus brief reporting
that policies that exclude transgender individuals exacerbate the individual's risk of
"anxiety and depression, low self-esteem, engaging in self injurious behaviors, sui-
cide," and "other adverse outcomes."313 Even without a catch-all method like clas-
sification analysis, such testimony may be replicable across common situations. For
example, a trial court in Florida accepted similar evidence in an affirmative Title IX
case brought by a transgender girl, 314 and similar expert medical background assisted
the constitutional challenge to the Trump Administration's ban on military service
based upon gender dysphoria.315
Parallels may be drawn to invidious colorism. In one case, a court permitted
two experts to explain how lighter-skinned Blacks may be perceived by Black em-
ployees with darker skin tone as receiving preferential treatment, within the larger
social context of whiteness as a privilege.316 Colorism in an opposite context may
also be true, as in a case alleging discrimination by darker-skinned Pakistani citizens
against a lighter-skinned Pakistani citizen in the United States. There, the court
noted that "the presumption of a protected ... status on the basis of color is bound
up with an entire national racial history," and held that a complete record at sum-
mary judgment required "evidence by way of expert testimony or treatise" to pro-
vide guidance.317
The intersectional capacity of multiaxial analysis across anti-discrimination
statutes, such as race and disability, or age and religion, is beyond the scope of one
article, and will be addressed in upcoming research reviewing the precedent and
illustrating approaches. Although legal scholars have noted the difficulties that non-
identical statutory language may pose across statutes even though such claims have
increased over time, 318 it is important to note that unlike their federal counterparts,
state and local antidiscrimination laws often combine all protected traits under one
313 Id. at 523, 523 n.17.
314 See also Adams ex red. Kasper v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cty., 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 1298-
99, 1298 n.14 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (in findings of fact for Title IX case brought by transgender
student, defining possible conceptions of gender relying upon evidence of expert in
developmental and clinical psychology specializing in treating transgender children and upon
similar medical amici).
315 Karnoski v. Trump, 926 F.3d 1180, 1187 n.1 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (citing Brief of
Amicus Curiae Am. Med. Ass'n et al. regarding transgender individuals with gender dysphoria and
outlining the sex and gender affirmation process).
316 Walker v. Sec'y of Treasury, 742 F. Supp. 670, 675 (N.D. Ga. 1990); f Kotkin, supra note
275, at 1448-49 (advocating for normalizing more extensive discovery and use of experts for
plaintiffs bringing multiple or overlapping claims of discrimination).
317 Ali v. Nat'l Bank of Pak., 508 F. Supp. 611, 612-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
318 See Kotkin, supra note 275, at 1487-97 (analyzing cases raising multiple claims, including
cross-statutory claims, and multiple-claim cases and observing some courts "have so constrained
the universe of available proof that it is impossible for plaintiffs to tease out a culture of subtle
bias against those who bring the most diversity to the workplace"); id. at 1457 (citing study in
which multiple-claims cases comprised 58% of employment cases in dataset).
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statute, and would not be preempted by federal law.3 19 Ultimately, the chief chal-
lenge to multiaxial analysis is not a lack of broad legal authority, duly entrusted to
the courts, but rather courts' neutrality and a respect for precedent willing to address
substantive questions.
CONCLUSION
Title VII causation doctrine remains fraught with conceptual error and is stat-
utorily inadequate. Treating "sex" as a binary, fixed, and homogenous classification
misapprehends both actual sex and what an aggrieved worker may articulate and
ultimately prove. Classification-only causation approaches have strained theoretical
legitimacy and utility under the amended statute. As decisions within the post-2015
correction demonstrated, Title VII is capable of contextually variable answers and
may navigate the socially contested nature of traits,320 just as Ulane I did for sex.
Multiaxial analysis is consistent with Title VII's statutory text and goals as a
powerful, remediating law that draws from social contexts for enforcement. In light
of Bostock's paradigm shift toward expansive causation, stakeholders including ju-
rists, counsel, and parties must resist totalizing approaches that undermine the law's
normative core.
319 See Calif. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987) (holding state law
granting pregnant employees up to four months of unpaid leave not preempted by Title VII's sex
provision).
320 Abrams, supra note 26, at 2533; Kwan, supra note 219, at 688.
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